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 This dissertation contains three essays on population economics.   
  The first essay focuses on the welfare comparisons of different population policy 
options. With special concern on China’s “one-child” population policy, we propose an 
alternative policy instrument for China that will perform better in increasing human capital 
investment, lowering fertility, and improving economic growth.  In this paper we consider 
two types of population policies: one through birth control as in China and the other 
through birth taxes. We find that both achieve the same equilibrium solution if tax revenue 
finances lump-sum transfers. By reducing fertility and promoting growth, these policies 
may achieve higher welfare than conventional education subsidies financed by income 
taxes. A birth tax for education subsidies can achieve the first-best solution. The welfare 
gain of the first-best policy may be equivalent to a massive 10-50 percent rise in income, 
depending on the degree of human capital externalities. 
The second essay discusses the effects of health investment on the survival rate of 
the population, and its consequent effects on the fertility transition and economic growth. 
In this essay, we incorporate mortality variable into the endogenous growth model, where 
agents choose between consumption, fertility choice, human capital investment and health 
investment to prolong life span. The result suggests that health investment increases along 
with income growth; fertility rate increases first and declines steadily toward the steady 
state level as the survival rate of agents rises with increasing health investment. A subsidy 
on health expenditure triggers a faster decline in fertility rate and leads to an increase in 
children's education, and hence income growth.  
 iv
The third essay pays special concerns on the problems of population aging, and the 
resulted problems on old-age support in both developed countries and in some developing 
countries. The reform in pension system is another important issue. This essay briefly 
reviews the cause of aging due to changing demography, and the changing of population 
age distribution. It conducts a short survey on the economic consequences caused by aging, 
i.e., the interactions between aging, saving and intergenerational wealth transfers, and how 
these factors response to unfunded and funded pension systems. With special attention on 
China's aging problem, this essay also reviews the features of China's pension systems 
under the planned economy and the new market-oriented economy; and reports the 
projections on aging and the financial needs for pension in China. An accelerating aging 
makes it difficult for China to take care of the pension needs of the elderly, as China is a 
low- or middle-income country that is facing challenges in its structural reform in every 
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Public policies on high fertility rates in developing
countries: birth control, birth taxes or education
subsidies?
Abstract
Developing countries typically have too many children and too little education.
In this paper we consider two types of population policies: one through birth con-
trol as in China and the other through birth taxes. We find that both achieve
the same equilibrium solution if tax revenue finances lump-sum transfers. By re-
ducing fertility and promoting growth, these policies may achieve higher welfare
than conventional education subsidies financed by income taxes. A birth tax for
education subsidies can achieve the first-best solution. The welfare gain of the
first-best policy may be equivalent to a massive 10-50% rise in income, depending
on the degree of human capital externalities.
Keywords: Fertility; Growth; Human capital externality; Welfare
JEL classification: J13; O11; H23; I30
1. Introduction
Owing to various factors such as human capital externalities in education, all countries
in early development suffer from having too many children and too little education.
Several types of public policies on education and fertility have emerged in the past several
decades to tackle this problem for a better perspective of economic growth. From an
economics perspective, we use a dynastic family model with human capital accumulation
to consider two types of public policies on fertility in this paper: one through birth
control as in China and the other through birth taxes. In addition to these population
policies, we also consider conventional education subsidies financed by income taxes. We
find that both types of population policies achieve the same equilibrium solution if birth
tax revenue finances lump-sum transfers. By reducing fertility and promoting growth,
these policies on fertility may achieve higher welfare than education subsidies financed
by income taxes. Using a birth tax to subsidize education spending can achieve the
first-best solution. Numerically, the welfare gain of implementing the first-best policy
may be equivalent to a massive 10-50% rise in income for every generation, depending
on the degree of human capital externalities.
Numerous empirical studies of cross-country growth performance find that standards
of living and economic growth are negatively associated with population growth; see e.g.
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). As a major con-
tributor to population growth, the fertility rate varies significantly between rich and
poor countries. According to the World Bank (2002), the average total fertility rate of
52 high-income countries, with a real GNI per capita above US$9,266 , is 1.7 children
per woman in 2000, which is almost 20% lower than the replacement fertility rate of 2.1
children per woman. By contrast, the average fertility rate of 63 low-income countries,
with a real GNI per capita below US$755, is 3.6 children per woman in 2000, which is
71% higher than the replacement rate. Also, there is much more state subsidization of
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education in developed countries than in developing countries according to the World
Bank (2002). It appears that conventional education subsidies financed by income taxes
may be an ideal means to resolve the problem of having too many children and too
little education in developing countries. Indeed, cross-country evidence in Zhang and
Casagrande (1998) indicates a statistically significant positive effect of education subsi-
dies on the growth rate of per capita GDP. However, the effect of education subsidies on
fertility is statistically insignificant in their cross-country evidence. Given this, we need
to explore whether public policies on fertility can help poor countries reduce their birth
rates and raise their education investment for faster economic growth.
There are also many theoretical studies of the negative relationship between fertility
and the level, or the growth rate, of income. Among them, Barro and Becker (1989)
show a negative relationship between the level of output per capita and the fertility
rate. With human capital accumulation, Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) argue
that a subsistence level of consumption per child can cause multiple equilibria in the
trade-off between the quantity and quality of children. When initial human capital is
low relative to subsistence consumption, the rate of return on human capital is low, and
hence parents choose a large number of children and make no education investment.
When initial human capital is high, subsistence consumption becomes negligible, and
hence parents choose a small number of children and invest in their education, leading to
sustainable economic growth. They also find that these two equilibria are stable. Thus,
a “big push” by good luck is necessary in their model for poor economies to break away
from the Malthusian poverty trap and move toward the sustainable growth path.
Morand (1999) and Tamura (2000) also provide similar multiple-equilibrium models
with a different mechanism to switch from one equilibrium to the other. For example, in
Morand’s model with income inequality and subsistence consumption for each child, hu-
man capital externalities can trickle down human capital growth to poor households that
have many children and make no investment in their education. Consequently, in the
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absence of any “big push”, average human capital in poor economies can grow slowly
to a threshold level associated with subsistence consumption. Beyond this threshold,
the growth rate will be higher and the average fertility rate will be lower when most
households make education investment and have fewer children. In addition to these
multiple-equilibrium models, the steady decline in mortality in most countries’ develop-
ment may have contributed to lower fertility in rich countries, according to Ehrlich and
Lui (1991) and Zhang, Zhang and Lee (2001), among others. Further, some institutional
factors may have caused lower fertility in developed than in developing countries as well,
including social security as in Cigno and Rosati (1992) and Zhang and Zhang (2004),
financial development as in Zhang (1999), and urbanization as in Zhang (2002).1 These
institutional factors allow workers to arrange their retirement income security and hence
reduce the role of children for old-age support. However, these studies have paid little
attention to how public population policies can help low-income countries decelerate
population growth and accelerate income growth.
As suggested by Sen (2000), it is important to ask whether public population policies
should be used to achieve a sharper decline in fertility in developing countries. These
public policies may use a collaborative approach that emphasizes a voluntary reduction
in births. In practice, however, some developing countries also use punitive population
policies. Facing huge population pressure and striving to promote economic growth,
China and India−−the two most populous countries in the world, have incorporated
population policies into their development plans (since the early 1950s in India and the
1960s in China). While India has mainly adopted a collaborative approach, China has
enforced a birth control policy since the late 1970s.2 According to the World Bank
1In Zhang (2003), if altruistic bequests are operative then a combination of government debt and
education subsidies can improve welfare by reducing fertility and raising education investment in the
presence of the human capital externality. However, there is no consensus with regard to what motivates
bequests; see, e.g., Laitner and Thomas (1996) and Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff (1997). Our results
in this paper do not depend on whether such bequests are operative.
2After a three-year severe famine in the early 1960s, the Chinese government launched a family
planning program to educate the population to have fewer children. This program yielded a moderate
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(2004), fertility has declined much more dramatically in China, from 5.78 in 1970 to
1.89 in 2000, than in India, from 5.77 in 1970 to 3.07 in 2000.
It is undoubted that the family planning policy has largely changed the reproductive
pattern in China, however, the coercive population policy in China has also been widely
criticized. Despite the family planning policy, economic development is another impor-
tant factor that affects population’s fertility choices. The fertility rate is low in cities
and economically developed regions relative to rural and less developed regions. The
fertility rates in big cities have been so low that the population growth rates are close to
or below zero; while in some regions, the preference for children are still high. In recent
years, the Chinese government has relaxed its birth control policy in metropolises like
Shanghai, to allow a couple who are the only child in their families, to have a second
child; while the regulations of the family planning policy in China remain the same in
other regions.
From the experiences in China and India, a public policy that will lead to lower
fertility rate is necessary; the question is whether a mandatory birth control policy
is the only way to fulfill the desire of lowering fertility. Taking this into account, it
is important to conduct an economic analysis on the effects of different public policy
instruments. In particular, it is important to compare birth control with birth taxes.
From this comparison, we can learn whether the tax policy is more or less effective than
the birth control policy in lowering fertility. We can also learn which policy can be
more conducive to education investment and economic growth. Further, we can learn
which policy can improve social welfare. According to our findings mentioned earlier,
it is indeed the case that the tax approach can outperform birth control in all these
dimensions.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section two introduces the model. Section
decline in fertility in the urban population but little change in fertility in the rural population which
accounted for 80% of the total population. In 1979, the government launched the birth control project,
see Banister (1987).
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three presents equilibrium solutions in various cases and derives the results. Section
four discusses policy implications, particularly for the case of China. The last section
concludes.
2. The model
Consider an economy with an infinite number of periods and overlapping-generations
of identical agents who live for two periods (childhood and adulthood, respectively).
Children embody human capital through education. Adults work, allocate income to
consumption and to investment in children’s education, and choose the number of chil-
dren. There is no distinction in gender. Each adult has one unit of labor time and
devotes it to child rearing and working. As in Becker et al. (1990), raising a child
requires v units of time where 0 < v < 1, which sets an upper limit on the number of
children, 1/v.
Let subscript t denote a period of time. The utility function of an altruistic parent,
Vt, depends on his/her own consumption ct, the number of children nt, and the average
utility of children V¯t+1. Since agents are identical, the utility of each child is the same,
that is, V¯t+1 = Vt+1. As in Zhang (1997, 2003), preferences are assumed to be:
Vt = ln ct + ρ lnnt + αVt+1, ρ > 0, 0 < α < 1, (1)
where ρ is the taste for the number of children, and α is the taste for per child welfare
or the subjective discounting factor.
The human capital of each child, Ht+1, depends positively on parental education
spending per child, qt, parental human capital, Ht, and the economy-wide average human









, A > 0, 0 < β < 1, 0 < δ < 1, (2)
where δ is the share parameter of education spending. Following Lucas (1988), we assume
6
that average human capital has a positive external effect on education for 0 < β < 1. A
smaller β means a stronger human capital externality.
Final output a worker produces is assumed to be equal to his/her effective labor
input, (1− vnt)Ht. The budget constraint of a parent is given by:
ct = (1− vnt)Ht − ntqt. (3)
When we consider taxes or subsidies later, the budget constraint will change accordingly.
3. Equilibrium and results
In this section, we begin with a competitive equilibrium without government intervention
and compare it to the social planner’s solution. We then derive competitive solutions
with various forms of population policies or with a conventional education subsidy fi-
nanced by income taxes. At the end of this section, we will also use a numerical approach
to explore the quantitative implications of the model.
3.1. Competitive equilibrium without government intervention















+ρ lnnt + αVt+1(Ht+1)
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. (4)














This condition implies that the marginal utility forgone from giving up an additional
unit of consumption to invest in children’s education equals the marginal utility obtained
from increasing the welfare of children through raising their human capital.
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Here, the marginal utility forgone from giving up vHt + qt units of consumption for one
additional child is compensated by the marginal utility obtained from having this child.
Denote the fraction of income spent on consumption per capita as γc, and the fraction
of income invested in a child’s education as γq, where γc = ct/[(1 − vnt)Ht] and γq =
qt/[(1 − vnt)Ht], respectively. In equilibrium, both fertility and proportional output
allocations are expected to be constant over time under our assumptions of a logarithmic
utility function and a Cobb-Douglas education technology.
Solving the first-order conditions and constraints in (2), (3), (5) and (6) yields the
competitive equilibrium solutions for fertility and for proportional income allocations:
γ∗c =
1− αβ(1− δ)− αδ
1− αβ(1− δ) , (7)
γ∗q =
αδ
n∗[1− αβ(1− δ)] , (8)
n∗ =
ρ[1− αβ(1− δ)− αδ]− αδ
v(1 + ρ)[1− αβ(1− δ)− αδ] . (9)
As expected, both fertility and the proportional income allocations are constant over
time. Also as expected, educational spending per child as a fraction of income is inversely
related to fertility in (8), exhibiting a trade-off between the quantity and the quality of
children. It is easy to verify that the solution (n∗, γ∗c , γ
∗
q ) indeed satisfies the first-order
conditions and constraints in all periods. In this sense, it is the solution for the entire
equilibrium path.
As in Zhang (1997), the sufficient condition for a unique interior equilibrium solution
is ρ > αδ/(1 − α), which implies ρ > αδ/[1 − αβ(1 − δ) − αδ] and hence n > 0 for all
β ∈ (0, 1). That is, when the taste for the number of children is sufficiently strong, there
exists a unique interior solution for fertility and hence for other choice variables.
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The growth rate of human capital is:
φ∗ = Ht+1/Ht − 1 = A(γ∗q )δ
(
1− vn∗
)δ − 1. (10)
According to (10), the growth rate of human capital depends positively on the fraction
of income invested in education for each child, γ∗q , and negatively on fertility, n
∗. Since
1−vn∗ is constant over time, final output is proportional to human capital in this model.
Therefore, the growth rate φ∗ in (10) is also the growth rate of per capita income in
this model. When the productivity parameter A is large enough such that φ∗ > 0, the




implies the solution for the sequence (ct, qt, nt)
∞
t=0 where nt = n
∗ for all t ≥ 0.
In order to determine optimal public policies later, let us find the solution for an
individual’s welfare level, given initial human capital H0. Substituting the solution for
(ct, qt, nt)
∞




















1− α lnH0. (11)
An individual’s welfare in (11) is fully determined by his or her initial human capital H0
and parameters in technologies and preferences via the solution (n∗, γ∗c , γ
∗
q ). Thus, (11)
gives a reduced-form solution for the welfare level.
3.2. Social planner’s solution
Differing from individual parents, the social planner can internalize the human capital
externality by setting Ht = H¯t when maximizing utility in (4) subject to (2) and (3).
Obviously, the social planner’s solution for (γc, γq, n) is a special case of the competitive
solution with β = 1:
γPc =
1− α




nP [1− α(1− δ)] , (13)
nP =
ρ(1− α)− αδ
v(1 + ρ)(1− α) , (14)
where the superscript P refers to the social planner. The growth rate of human capital,
or that of output per capita, can be derived as:
φP = A[γPq (1− vnP )]δ − 1. (15)
Since the social planner can internalize the external effect of average human capital
in the society as a whole, the growth rate of human capital, or that of output per
capita, is higher in the social planner’s solution than in the competitive solution. This
can be seen as follows. Comparing the competitive solution in (7)-(9) with the social
optimum in (12)-(14), both fertility and the fraction of output spent on consumption
are higher but the fraction of output spent on education is lower in the former solution
than in the latter. Intuitively, in the presence of the human capital externality, the
private rate of return on education investment relative to that on having a child is lower
than the social rate. Therefore, in the decentralized economy with the human capital
externality, parents have more children and allocate more output to consumption and
less to education investment than their social optimum. A stronger externality means a
larger gap between the private rate and the social rate of return, and hence larger gaps
in fertility, in the proportional allocation of output and in the growth rate between the
competitive solution and the social planner’s. Specifically, differentiating the solution in
equations (7)-(9) in the decentralized economy with respect to β, we have ∂γ∗c/∂β < 0,
∂γ∗q/∂β > 0, and ∂n
∗/∂β < 0. That is, as β becomes smaller, which is equivalent to
a stronger human capital externality, both fertility and the fraction of income spent
on consumption rise, but the fraction of income spent on each child’s education falls.
These consequences of the human capital externality conform to the stylized facts in less
developed countries.
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It is thus interesting to consider government policies that affect parents’ decisions on
fertility and education spending such that the gap between the competitive equilibrium
and the social planner’s optimal path can be narrowed. Through the trade-off between
the quantity and quality of children, policies that lower fertility will raise private eduction
investment for each child, and will therefore accelerate human capital accumulation and
income growth. In the rest of the paper, we consider two types of such policies that
influence the decision on the number of children: one through birth control and the
other through birth taxes. The case with birth taxes will be split further into two
scenarios, depending on whether the tax revenue is made as lump-sum transfers or as
education subsidies. We will compare the respective effects of these different population
policies on education investment, fertility, economic growth and welfare. Finally, we will
compare all these population policies to a conventional education subsidy financed by
income taxes.
3.3. Birth control
Consider a situation whereby the government sets an upper limit on the number of
children for every family in a way to maximize the welfare level of the representative
household. For the purpose of this paper, we focus on the case that this upper limit
is binding. The analysis involves two stages. In the first stage, parents choose their
consumption and education investment for their children to maximize utility in equation
(4), while taking the mandatory limit on the number of children nC as given, where the
superscript C refers to birth control. Parental decisions in the competitive solution will
be functions of the mandatory limit on births. In the second stage, the government
can then maximize the welfare of the representative agent by choosing the level of the
mandatory limit on births.
In equilibrium, γCc = [1 − αβ(1 − δ) − αδ]/[1 − αβ(1 − δ)] and γCq = αδ/{nC[1 −
αβ(1−δ)]}. In order to determine the fertility level that maximizes individuals’ welfare,
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we replace (γ∗c , γ
∗
q , n
∗) in V0 of equation (11) by (γCc , γ
C
q , n
C). In so doing, we obtain the
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1− α lnH0. (16)
The optimal mandatory limit on births corresponds to the fertility rate that maximizes
V C. We thus have the following result:
Proposition 1. With 0 < β < 1, the optimal birth control policy improves welfare by
setting fertility at the social optimum: nC = nP = [ρ(1− α)− αδ]/[v(1 + ρ)(1− α)].


















Setting dV C/dnC = 0 in (17) leads to the claimed value of nC. The second-order condi-













under the assumption ρ > αδ/(1− α). The result follows.
Notice that the optimal level of fertility under birth control is the same as that
chosen by the social planner. The reason for this equality between the two fertility
rates is that both the government and the social planner can choose the fertility rate
to internalize the human capital externality. Unlike the social planner, however, the
government in the case with birth control does not decide how to allocate income to
consumption and to children’s education. Thus, there should be under-investment in
education in the equilibrium solution with birth control in the presence of the human
capital externality. Specifically, the ratio of total education spending to output in the
competitive solution with birth control, nCγCq = αδ/(1−αβ(1− δ)), is the same as that
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in the competitive solution without birth control, which is below its social optimum,
nPγPq = αδ/(1− α(1− δ)).
Further, since birth control reduces fertility and since it does not change the ratio
of total education spending to output, education investment per child as a fraction of
output per worker is higher in the equilibrium solution with birth control than without.
On the other hand, since birth control leads to the same fertility rate but a lower ratio
of total education investment to output than the social optimum, education investment
per child as a fraction of output is lower in the competitive solution with birth control





The growth rate of human capital, or that of output, under birth control is: φC =
A[γCq (1 − vnC)]δ − 1. Since γ∗q < γCq < γPq , and n∗ > nC = nP , the growth rate φC in
the competitive solution with birth control must be higher than that in the competitive
solution without government intervention, but must be lower than that in the social
planner’s solution.
The welfare loss of altruistic parents by having fewer children will be compensated
by the dynamic welfare gains arising from more education investment per child and a
subsequent rise in productivity. Starting with too many children and two little education
in the presence of the externality, the welfare level is maximized by setting fertility at
nC = nP as given in Proposition 1 under birth control. However, since there is still under-
investment in education with birth control compared to the social planner’s solution, the
birth control policy cannot reach the first-best solution.
Summing up the analysis above, we have the following results:
Proposition 2. For 0 < β < 1, the birth control policy increases education investment
per child relative to output and the growth rate of output. However, the ratio of education
spending to output and the growth rate are still lower than their social optimum. Thus,
the birth control policy cannot reach the first-best solution.
Proof. To measure the net gain in per capita income growth, we determine the ratio of
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since nC = nP < n∗. Similarly, we determine the ratio of the gross growth rates,




A[γCq (1− vnP )]













since nC = nP . The other results follow our earlier analysis.
Though the birth control policy lowers fertility and improves growth and welfare,
the decision on the number of children is not made voluntarily by individual parents.
We now consider a birth tax policy as an alternative means, which allows parents to
choose the number of children. The birth tax revenue may finance a lump-sum transfer
or an education subsidy. We first consider the case in which the tax revenue is made as
transfers.
3.4. Birth taxes for lump-sum transfers
In this case, the government imposes a tax on each additional birth in excess of a
threshold number of children, ntax, and makes the tax revenue as lump-sum transfers.
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The household budget constraint becomes
ct = (1− vnt)Ht − qtnt − (nt − ntax)TtB +Πt, (18)
where Tt is the birth tax, Πt is the lump-sum transfer per worker, and B is an indicator
variable which equals 1 for nt ≥ ntax and equals 0 for nt < ntax. A balanced government
budget constraint requires Πt = (nt − ntax)TtB. Since optimal birth-tax policies do not
emerge in the situation with nt < ntax, we will suppress B in our analysis for brevity.
3In practice, the birth tax in China does not apply to the first birth. That is, in the real world it is
natural to have ntax ≥ 1. In our model with a single type of gender, we may have ntax ≥ 1/2.
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The first-order condition with respect to education investment is the same as in (5).




vHt + qt + Tt
ct
. (19)
It is clear that the birth tax increases the marginal loss in utility of having a child on
the right-hand side of (19). Therefore, we expect a negative effect of the birth tax on
fertility.
The solution for the ratio of total education investment to income is the same as
in the preceding cases without government intervention or with birth control, that is,
γTq n
T = γCq n
C = γ∗qn
∗ = αδ/[1− αβ(1− δ)], where the superscript T stands for the case
where the birth tax finances lump-sum transfers. Clearly, the ratio of total education





is also independent of the birth tax. Define τ = Tt/H¯t, as we expect the birth tax to
be proportional to average income or average human capital on the equilibrium growth
path.
The solution for fertility is indeed a decreasing function of the birth tax:
nT =
ρ[1− αβ(1− δ)− αδ]− αδ
v(1 + ρ)[1− αβ(1− δ)− αδ] + τ [1− αβ(1− δ)] . (20)
The negative effect of birth taxes on fertility is consistent with empirical evidence in
Boyer (1989) and Whittington, Alm and Peters (1990). In Boyer’s work, child allowances
under the Old Poor Law had a positive effect on birth rates in 1826-1830 in southeastern
England, as argued by Malthus (1807, 1872). In the work of Whittington et al., personal
exemptions for dependants have a positive effect on birth rates in the United States.
Both the child allowances and the personal exemptions for dependants in the tax system
are like birth subsidies, which are the opposite of birth taxes.
The solution for the welfare level has the same expression as in the cases without
government intervention or with birth control. We then have the following result:
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Proposition 3. For 0 < β < 1, the optimal birth tax financing lump-sum transfers is:
0 < ntax < n
P and
τ ∗ =
α2δv(1 + ρ)(1− δ)(1− β)
[ρ(1− α)− αδ][1− αβ(1− δ)] .
It achieves exactly the same equilibrium solution as that under optimal birth control.
Proof. Substituting (nT , γTc , γ
T
q ) into the solution for welfare in (11) to replace (n
∗, γ∗c , γ
∗
q ),
the welfare level becomes a function of the tax rate via nT , denoted by V T . Differenti-















nT (1− α) −
αδv
(1− α)(1− vnT )
]
= 0.






nT (1− α) −
αδv
(1− α)(1− vnT ) = 0.
The second-order condition holds as in the proof of Proposition 1. From these conditions
and the solution for fertility in (20), we obtain the solution for the optimal tax rate τ ∗.
Substituting τ ∗ into (20), it is easy to verify that nT = nC = nP . Combining this with
γTq n
T = γCq n
C, we have γTq = γ
C
q . Now, it is also easy to verify that both the growth
rate and the welfare level are the same as those with the optimal birth control policy.
From the government budget constraint and the solution (nT , τ) = (nP , τ∗), we have
Πt = (n
P − ntax)τ ∗Ht. We can thus choose any value of ntax as long as 0 < ntax < nP ,
because the lump-sum transfer can vary to balance the government budget.
Intuitively, the birth tax reduces fertility by increasing the cost of having a child.
When the tax revenue is made as lump-sum transfers, the birth tax has no effect on
the ratio of total education investment to output because it does not affect how parents
allocate income to their own consumption and to their children’s education. Combining
these two results together, the birth tax must raise education investment per child as a
fraction of output, and hence must raise the growth rate of output. Since total education
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investment as a fraction of output is lower than its social optimum as in the case with
birth control, the optimal birth tax financing lump-sum transfers cannot reach the first-
best solution. Also like the optimal birth control policy, the optimal birth tax financing
lump-sum transfers has a lower growth rate of output than the social optimum. To
implement this tax, the government can choose a pair of the threshold number of children
and the amount of transfers such that 0 < ntax < n
P . Next, we explore the case when
the birth tax revenue is used to subsidize education.
3.5. Birth taxes for education subsidies
Now, we assume that the government subsidizes education spending for every child at
a rate s, using the revenue collected from the birth tax. Assume that the birth-tax
payment is increasing in the number of children in a simple form: (nt − ntax)θTt where
1 ≥ θ > 0. We will see that the restriction on θ has subtle implications for a proper
choice of ntax, when the tax revenue finances education subsidies. Also, Tt = τH¯t, as in
the preceding case. The household’s budget constraint (3) becomes:
ct = (1− vnt)Ht − (1− s)qtnt − (nt − ntax)θTt, (21)
and the government’s budget constraint is:
(nt − ntax)θTt = ntsqt. (22)












In this condition, the subsidy rate reduces the cost of education investment proportion-
ately (the LHS), while it reduces the benefit of education less than proportionately (the
RHS). As a result, the education subsidy tends to raise education investment.
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The first-order condition with respect to fertility is:






In this condition, the birth tax increases the cost of having a child, and hence tends to
reduce fertility. On the other hand, the education subsidy reduces the cost of having
a child less than proportionately, compared to its proportionate effect on the cost of
education mentioned above.
These first-order conditions and the budget constraints of households and the gov-
ernment lead to:
γEc =
(1− s)[1− αβ(1− δ)]− αδ
(1− s)[1− αβ(1− δ)] , (25)
γEq =
αδ
nE(1− s)[1− αβ(1− δ)] , (26)
ργEc (1− vnE) = vnE + (1− s)γEq nE(1− vnE) + τnEθ(nE − ntax)θ−1. (27)
The superscript E stands for the case with the birth tax financing education subsidies.
Note that the solution (nE, γEc , γ
E
q ) is a function of policies chosen by the government
(s, τ, ntax).
Like the birth tax for lump-sum transfers, the birth tax for education subsidies
raises the cost of having a child, and hence reduces fertility. On the other hand, using
the birth tax revenue to subsidize education investment raises the rate of return on
education investment, and hence induces parents to spend more on education and less
on consumption. Because of this, the birth tax for education subsidies is expected to
have a positive effect on the growth rate of income. Both the decline in fertility and the
rise in education investment, caused by the birth tax for education subsidies, help to
narrow the gaps between the competitive solution and the social planner’s solution, in
the presence of the human capital externality. We thus expect this policy to outperform
birth control and the birth tax for lump-sum transfers in terms of social welfare. We
give the results below and relegate the proof to Appendix A:
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Proposition 4. With 0 < β < 1, the optimal birth tax financing education subsidies
obtains the first-best solution, (nE, γEc , γ
E
q ) = (n
P , γPc , γ
P
q ), by setting
s∗ =
α(1− δ)(1− β)




ργPc (1− vnP )− vnP − (1− s∗ + θs∗)γPq nP (1− vnP )





P (1− vnP )
(nP − n∗tax)
.
We have s∗ > 0, n∗tax < n
P , and τ ∗ > 0. Also, if 0 < θ < 1, then n∗tax > 0; if θ = 1, then
n∗tax = 0.
It is interesting to note that the threshold number of births to face the birth tax
depends on the value of θ. When θ = 1, this threshold number of children is equal to
zero, and hence there is a flat tax Tt on all children. In this case, the total tax payment
is proportional to the number of children. When 0 < θ < 1, this threshold number of
children is positive and below the socially optimal rate of fertility. In this last case, the
total tax payment is a more complicated function of the number of children. When the
number of children rises just from the tax-free threshold level n∗tax, there is a jump from
a zero to a positive tax payment. Beyond this, a further rise in the number of children,
which gains diminishing marginal utility, leads to a less-than-proportional rise in the tax
payment for θ ∈ (0, 1). In our numerical experiment later, we will explore how the value
of θ can determine the threshold number of children ntax.
It is also interesting to compare the various forms of public population policies to a
conventional education subsidy financed by income taxes in the presence of the human
capital externality. In a similar model, Zhang and Casagrande (1998) focus on how an
education subsidy financed by income taxes affects fertility and education investment,
without taking the human capital externality into account and without considering the
welfare consequence. Here, with the human capital externality we will also consider how
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such a policy affects welfare and make a welfare comparison between this conventional
policy and the various forms of population policies we have analyzed.
3.6. Comparisons: education subsidies financed by different
taxes
3.6..1 Education subsidies financed by income taxes
With an income tax at a rate τ and an education subsidy at a rate s, the household
budget constraint becomes:
ct = (1− vnt)(1− τ)Ht − (1− s)qtnt, (28)
and the government budget balance requires:
τ(1− vnt)Ht = sntqt.











The first-order condition with respect to the number of children is:






According to these first-order conditions, the income tax and the education subsidy
have opposing effects on the net marginal benefits of both education investment and the
number of children, respectively. The education subsidy tends to raise the rate of return
on education investment, whereas the income tax does the opposite. Comparing the left-
hand sides of both equations above, the education subsidy reduces the cost of education
proportionately, while it reduces the cost of having a child less than proportionately. As
a result, the education subsidy tends to tip the trade-off between the quality and the
quantity of children towards the former. However, the income tax reduces the time cost
of having a child, and hence tends to raise fertility.
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The solution for fertility turns out to be the same as that in the competitive equilib-
rium without government intervention:
nS = n∗ =
ρ[1− αβ(1− δ)− αδ]− αδ
v(1 + ρ)[1− αβ(1− δ)− αδ] , (31)
where the superscript S stands for this conventional education subsidy. That is, using
an income tax to subsidize children’s education has no effect on the fertility rate, which
is consistent with empirical evidence from cross-country data in Zhang and Casagrande
(1998). This observation motivates our use of the logarithmic utility function, beyond
its benefit of keeping the model tractable, because a more general utility function would
likely link the level of fertility to the conventional education subsidy financed by income
taxes.
Further, as expected, the education subsidy induces parents to spend less on con-
sumption and more on children’s education:
γSc =
(1− s)[1− αβ(1− δ)− αδ]
(1− s)[1− αβ(1− δ)] + sαδ , (32)
nSγSq =
αδ
(1− s)[1− α(1− δ)] + sαδ . (33)
We now provide the optimal subsidy rate and the optimal income tax rate below:




1− αβ(1− δ)− αδ ; τ
∗ =
α2δ(1− δ)(1− β)
[1− α(1− δ)][1− αβ(1− δ)− αδ] .
It improves welfare by raising the ratio of education investment to output. But it has no
effect on fertility. Thus, it cannot reach the first-best solution.
Proof. By (31), the fertility rate with the income tax and the education subsidy is the
same as that without government intervention. In other words, fertility is independent of
the subsidy/tax rates under a balanced government budget. Substituting the solution for
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(nS, γSc , γ
S
q ) in equations (31)-(33) into the solution for welfare and maximizing welfare
by choosing s, we can obtain the claimed optimal subsidy rate s∗. Substituting s∗ into
(32) and (33), we have the same proportional output allocations to consumption and to









1− α(1− δ) .
Thus, the ratio of consumption to output here is less than that in the case without
government intervention, while the ratio of total education spending to output is greater.
However, because the fertility rate is greater than its social optimum, the resultant
education spending per child as a fraction of output is lower than its social optimum.
Thus, the income-tax-financed eduction subsidy cannot reach the first-best solution.
Using the government budget balance plus the solution nSγSq = αδ/[1 − α(1 − δ)] and
γSc = (1− α)/[1− α(1− δ)], we can then find τ ∗.
3.6..2 Education subsidies financed by lump-sum taxes
To make a further comparison, we consider the education subsidy that is financed by
the lump sum taxes. With a lump sum tax at Γt and an education subsidy at a rate s,
the household budget constraint becomes:
ct = (1− vnt)Ht − (1− s)qtnt − Γt, (34)
and the government budget balance requires Γt = sntqt.











Similar to the birth tax scenario, this condition implies that, the subsidy rate reduces the
cost of education investment proportionately (the LHS), while it reduces the benefit of
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education less than proportionately (the RHS). As a result, the education subsidy tends
to increase the return on education investment, and hence raises education investment.
The first-order condition with respect to the number of children is:






In this condition, the education subsidy reduces the cost of education, which tends to
raise the rate of return on education investment. As a result, the first order conditions
imply that the education subsidy tends to tip the trade-off between the quality and the
quantity of children towards the former.









(1− s)[1− αβ(1− δ)− αδ] + ρ[(1− s)[1− αβ(1− δ)]− αδ]
} , (37)
where the superscript L stands for this education subsidy that is financed by lump sum
tax. Compared to the competitive equilibrium fertility rate n∗, it is easy to verify that
for any positive education subsidy, s > 0, we have nL < n∗.
The equilibrium proportional consumption under education subsidy financed by lump
sum tax is:
γLc =
(1− s)[1− αβ(1− δ)]− αδ
(1− s)[1− αβ(1− δ)] , (38)
As expected, the education subsidy induces parents to spend less on consumption,
and more on human capital investment. Compared to the competitive equilibrium con-
sumption level, we have γLc < γ
∗
c . Therefore, the total education spending on children,




(1− s)[1− αβ(1− δ)] . (39)
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Solving for the per child education spending under education subsidy financed by




(1 + ρ)(1− s)[1− αβ(1− δ)]− αδ(1 + ρ− s)
}
(1− s)[1− αβ(1− δ)]
{
ρ(1− s)[1− αβ(1− δ)]− αδ(1 + ρ− s)
} . (40)
Unlike the other schemes discussed in the previous sections, solving for the optimal
subsidy rate and the optimal lump tax level is analytical intractable, we provide a
special scenario for comparison. We find that with education subsidy that is financed
by the lump sum tax, parents tend to have less children and invest more on the human
capital of their children. When the subsidy rate is sufficiently high, the fertility rate can
reach the social planner’s level, that is nL = nP :
Lemma 1. For 0 < β < 1, there exits a sufficient high rate of education subsidy,
financed by lump sum tax:
s¯ =
α(1 + ρ)(1− δ)(1− β)
α(1− δ)(1− β) + ρ[1− αβ(1− δ)] ; Γ¯ =
α2δ(1− δ)(1− β)
ρ[1− αβ(1− δ)] .
such that it improves welfare by reducing the fertility rate to social optimal level and
raising the ratio of education investment to output. But the total education investment
is below the social optimal level, thus it cannot reach the first-best solution.
Proof. Allowing the fertility rate in (37) be equal to the social optimal fertility rate
in (14), we can obtain the education subsidy rate s¯ as claimed above. The level of
lump sum tax, Γ¯, to finance the education subsidy is obtained by government’s balanced
budget.
For the total education investment, nLγLq , it is easy to verify that this value is less
than the total education investment of the social optimal level nγq.
With the education subsidy, per child education investment increases, which induces a
quality-quantity trade-off and leads to a lower fertility level. However, with the presence
of human capital externality, the proportional consumption is above that of the social
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planner’s; and the total proportional education spending is below social planner’s level,
hence, this is not the first-best solution.
Comparing all the different policies, the education subsidy financed by an income tax
can increase education investment to its social optimum, while birth control or the birth
tax for lump-sum transfers can lower fertility to its social optimum. However, none of
them can achieve both. It can be shown that birth control or the birth tax for lump-sum
transfers may or may not achieve higher welfare than the education subsidy financed by
an income tax. The first-best policy option analyzed in this model is the birth tax for
education subsidies.
Within this framework, the only distortion is human capital externality. With the
presence of this externality, the fertility rate is higher and the per child education spend-
ing is lower then those of the social optimal levels. As a result, a single instrument alone,
to adjust education investment or fertility rate, cannot lead to a first-best outcome. On
the one hand, subsidizing education of the next generation may improve the proportional
education spending of each child to the social optimal level, but the distortion on the
number of children is not being corrected (e.g., the birth tax for lump sum transfer, birth
tax financed by income tax discussed earlier). On the other hand, though government
mandatory birth control scheme lowers fertility rate to social optimal level, it does not
lead the per child education spending to its social optimum. The first-best result is pos-
sibly achieved when we have instruments that work on both factors, i.e., the quantity,
n, and the quality, γq, of the children, such that these variables will ultimately reach the
social optima. We have shown in section 3.5 that a birth tax to finance the education
subsidy will eventually reach the first-best result, while birth tax for lump sum transfer
is not a first-best.
However, the functional forms assumed within this framework may affect the results.
We choose to use the logarithm utility and Cobb-Douglas technology simply for the
convenience to compare the outcomes by different policy instruments.
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At the end of the paper, we present a summary of the results in different government
policy schemes that have been discussed in the preceding sections to have a straightfor-
ward comparison for these policy instruments, as shown in Table 1.1.
Finally, we present numerical results to illustrate the quantitative implications of
this model.
3.7. Numerical results
For plausible parameterizations, it is interesting to look at whether the equilibrium
solutions can differ significantly across all these cases in terms of fertility, education
investment, economic growth and welfare. As reported in a large empirical literature,
the rate of return to R&D ranging from 30% to over 100%, and there is a gap of the
rate of social returns to human capital between theoretical and empirical literature (see
Jones and Williams, 1997). Further more, the public education policy varies over time
and across countries, there is little empirical evidence on the degree of the education
externalities, 1−β. We thus let β vary widely from 0.1 to 0.9. The choice on the discount
factor α is based on the single period discount rate found by Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1987) of 0.98, and is similar to that found by Kydland and Proscott (1992) of 0.96.
As we assume that one period of our overlapping generations model corresponds to 20
years, the agents discount the future at 0.67 (approximately the value of 0.98520). While
in some relevant literature, e.g., Zhang (2003), the discount factor is higher than this
value. We thus compromise, to let α = 0.75, so that it is a reasonable value which falls
within the range of values stated in literature. Other parameters are chosen to generate
realistic values of fertility and the growth rate. Also, we normalize initial human capital
to unity, and regard the length of one period in this model as 20 years to convert the
growth rate φ into its annual rate g.
The numerical results are presented in Table 1.2. The first column of Table 1.2
indicates the various cases: no government intervention, birth control (or the birth tax
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for transfers), the conventional education subsidy through income taxes, and the birth
tax for education subsidies (the social optimum). Among these cases, we regard the first-
best birth tax for education subsidies as the benchmark case. From the second to the
last column of Table 1.2, we give our numerical results for the fertility rate n, the ratio
of education investment per child to output γq, the annual growth rate of output per
worker g, the welfare level V , the tax rate, the subsidy rate, and the equivalent payment,
respectively. The equivalent payment measures the percentage change in income we
should add to a non-benchmark case in every period, µYt = µ(1− vn)Ht, so as to reach
the same welfare level in the benchmark case:4
V non−benchmark0 +
1
1− α ln(1 + µ) = V
benchmark
0 .
In other words, the equivalent payment indicates the gain in welfare in terms of a
percentage change in income in every period when we move from a non-benchmark case
to the benchmark case.
According to our numerical results in Table 1.2, there are substantial differences in
the fertility rate, the ratio of education spending per child to output per worker, and
the growth rate of income per worker. For example, when the externality has medium
strength with β = 0.5, the fertility rate is 1.111 in cases with birth control or with birth
taxes for either transfers or education subsidies, while it is 2.929 in cases without any
population policy (education subsidies financed by income taxes or no intervention).
Interestingly, the ratio of education spending per child to output and the growth rate of
output per worker are much higher in the cases with birth control or with birth taxes
than in the case with the education subsidy financed by income taxes. Also, the welfare
level is higher with birth control or with birth taxes than with the education subsidy
financed by income taxes. Moreover, it is interesting to note that the first-best case (the
birth tax for education subsidies) has a much higher ratio of education spending per
4This is to add
∑∞
t=0 α
t ln(1 + µ) = [ln(1 + µ)]/(1 − α) to the welfare solution in (11) for a non-
benchmark case.
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child to output and a much higher growth rate than all the other cases. In particular,
replacing birth control by a birth tax for education subsidies can achieve a much higher
growth rate of income and a much higher ratio of education spending per child to income
but has the same fertility rate, suggesting a promising reform direction for the Chinese
population policy. This observation suggests that there are large dynamic gains through
internalizing the human capital externality.
Indeed, there are considerable gains in welfare from a non-benchmark case to the
benchmark in terms of percentage changes in income, particularly for small values of
β (strong human capital externalities). First, the gain in welfare by moving from the
no government case to the benchmark case with birth taxes for education subsidies is
equivalent to a 59.6% gain in income for β = 0.1, or a 32% gain in income for β = 0.5.
Second, the gain in welfare by moving from the birth control case to the benchmark is
equivalent to a 24.2% gain in income for β = 0.1, or an 11.3% gain in income for β = 0.5.
Third, the gain in welfare by moving from the conventional education subsidy through
income taxes to the benchmark is equivalent to a 28% gain in income for β = 0.1, or an
18.8% gain in income for β = 0.5. These gains are too large to be ignored.
In the case of the first-best birth tax for education subsidies, what is the quanti-
tative relationship between the threshold number of children to face the birth tax and
the parameter θ in the tax function? In Proposition 4, the value of θ does not affect
the equilibrium solution for income allocations, fertility and the optimal subsidy rate,
provided that we have 1 ≥ θ > 0. The relevance of the value of θ is to determine an im-
plementable threshold ntax ≥ 1/2 in this single-gender model (see footnote 3), together
with the tax rate. From the same parameterization as that in Table 1.2, we set θ = 0.1,
0.2, 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5, respectively. The corresponding values of n∗tax are 1.00, 0.89, 0.78,
0.67, and 0.56, all of which are above 1/2 and hence implementable. For larger values
of θ, the corresponding values of n∗tax are below 1/2, and hence are not implementable.
The tax rate in the benchmark case with the birth tax for education subsidies varies
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from over 20% of average output to below 10%, increasing with the threshold level of
fertility and with the strength of the externality.
4. Policy implications and applications
We now apply our model to China’s population policies, especially the “one-child” pol-
icy. When the Chinese government started family planning programs in the 1960s, it
attempted mainly to educate the population to have later marriages, fewer children and
longer intervals between births. As a result, there was a moderate decline in the birth
rate of the urban population. However, the birth rate of the rural population, which
accounted for 80% of the total population, remained high. Under mounting population
pressure in both urban and rural areas, the Chinese government introduced a strict pop-
ulation policy using quotas to limit the size of families in 1979.5 Since then, the average
total fertility rate of China has fallen to 1.89 in 2000 as mentioned earlier.6 This fertility
rate is close to those in developed countries.
As was observed in industrialized countries, the dramatic decline in fertility has been
accompanied by remarkable economic growth in China. The GDP growth rate has been
on average over 8 percent per year since 1978, and the growth rate of GDP per capita
has been over 7 percent. The sharp decline in birth rates appears to have contributed,
among other factors, to such remarkable per capita GDP growth, as our model suggests.
As opposed to birth control by the government, our model provides an alternative
policy combination: birth taxes and education subsidies. The birth tax raises the cost
5There are basically three categories of quotas: urban parents cannot have more than one child;
rural parents can have a second child if the first one is a girl; ethnic minority groups can have more
than two children. Based on the quotas and the shares of these respective population groups in the
total population, the average “policy-targeted” fertility rate of China is approximately 1.5 per woman,
which is much lower than the replacement fertility rate; see Guo, Zhang, Gu and Wang (2003).
6Some studies have investigated the effects of China’s population policies on fertility. Scotese and
Wang (1995) suggest that birth control may have a significant negative effect on fertility only in the
short run. In their view, in order to have a persistent effect on fertility, there has to be a change in
the preferences for fewer children. Whyte and Gu (1990) argue that most Chinese parents still prefer
having at least two children to having just one, despite the sharp drop in fertility as a result of the
government’s one-child policy.
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of having children, while the education subsidy reduces the cost of education. Con-
sequently, blending them together can achieve an ideal balance between the number
and the education of children. It leads to more education investment, faster economic
growth and the same fertility rate, compared to the case with birth control. If the hu-
man capital externality is indeed a key factor causing too many children and too little
education in poor countries, this alternative policy also leads to higher social welfare
than the birth control policy does. Indeed, the Chinese government has recently relaxed
its birth control policy by allowing a couple, who are the only child in their families, to
pay for a second or third birth, a partial move toward the birth tax. A more complete
transition to the first-best birth tax will include phasing out the mandatory birth quotas
and spending the birth tax revenue on education and health care for all children. Also,
when the first birth is tax free as in China, we call for more caution in determining the
tax payment for each additional birth. As described in Proposition 4, in order to achieve
the first-best outcome, a further rise in the number of children exceeding the threshold
level requires a less-than-proportional rise in birth tax payments per family.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the trade-off between the number and the education of
children in an endogenous growth model. In the presence of a human capital externality,
education investment and the growth rate of income are lower and fertility is higher in
the competitive solution than their socially optimal levels, a highly relevant situation in
developing countries. We have shown that although a birth control policy can improve
welfare by reducing fertility to its social optimum, it cannot raise education investment
to its social optimum. Collecting a birth tax for lump-sum transfers achieves the same
equilibrium solution as that with the birth control policy. Taxing income to subsidize
education investment improves welfare by promoting education investment and economic
growth, but cannot reduce fertility to its social optimum. In addition, the growth rate
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of output with this conventional education subsidy through income taxes is lower than
the socially optimal rate, and may be lower than the level with birth control or birth
taxes for transfers. The most desirable policy in this model is to tax births and use the
tax revenue to subsidize education.
An interesting application to the reform of the Chinese population policy is to replace
its coercive birth control by the birth tax for education subsidies. Our numerical results
indicate that such a move can achieve a much higher growth rate of per capita income
and a much higher ratio of education spending to income. We have also paid careful
attention to relevant features of the birth tax structure concerning how to design an
implementable threshold number of children to start paying the tax. Numerically, the
welfare gain of implementing the first-best policy may be equivalent to a massive 10-60%
rise in income, depending on where to start and on the strength of the externality. It is
hard to imagine another policy that can gain so much for developing countries.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 4. Substituting the solution (γEc , γ
E
q , n
E) into (11), the first-order













which leads to nE = nP = [ρ(1− α)− αδ]/[v(1 + ρ)(1− α)] since ∂nE/∂τ 6= 0 according
to (27).





(1− α){(1− s)[1− αβ(1− δ)]− αδ} +
1− α(1− δ)









where the large coefficient on ∂nE/∂s is equal to zero from the above first-order condition
∂V E/∂∂τ = 0. Thus, these two first-order conditions above imply the claimed value of
s∗. Substituting the solution for s∗ into the solution for (γEc , γ
E
q ) in (25) and (26) yields
(γEc , γ
E




q ). Consequently, the growth rate and welfare will be the same as those
in the social planner’s solution. The remaining task is to find τ ∗ and n∗tax.
From the government budget constraint and (nE, γEc , γ
E
q ) = (n
P , γPc , γ
P
q ), we have
s∗γPq n
P (1− vnP ) = (nP − ntax)θτ.
Combining this with (27) gives
n∗tax =
nP [ργPc (1− vnP )− vnP − (1− s∗ + θs∗)γPq nP (1− vnP )]
ργPc (1− vnP )− vnP − (1− s∗)γPq nP (1− vnP )
.
Because ργPc (1− vnP )− vnP − (1− s∗+ θs∗)γPq nP (1− vnP ) < ργPc (1− vnP )− vnP − (1−
s∗)γPq n
P (1− vnP ), we have n∗tax < nP . To show n∗tax > 0, it is sufficient to show that the
numerator in the above expression for n∗tax is positive. In so doing, we substitute the
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solution for (s∗, nP , γPc , γ
P
q ) into this numerator and collect terms:
G(θ) ≡ ργPc (1− vnP )− vnP − (1− s∗ + θs∗)γPq nP (1− vnP )
=
α2δ(1− δ)(1− β)(1− θ)
(1 + ρ)(1− α)[1− αβ(1− δ)] .
Clearly, sign n∗tax =sign G(θ) =sign 1 − θ. That is, n∗tax = 0 if θ = 1; n∗tax > 0 if
θ < 1. From the government budget constraint and the solution for (s∗, n∗tax), we have
τ ∗ = s∗γPq n
P (1− vnP )/(nP − n∗tax).
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Table 1.1 A comparison – summary of results with
different government policies
Public policy Equilibrium results Social
instruments planner’s










q , φ ↑, V ↑
Birth taxes for γTc = γ
C
c , n
T = nC, below
lump-sum transfer γTq = γ
C
q , φ ↑, V ↑,







E = nP , equal
education subsidies φ ↑, V ↑,
Education subsidies γSc = γ
P
c , n
S > nP , γSq < γ
P
q , below
by income taxes φ ↑, V ↑,
Notes: 1. φ ↑, V ↑, in column 2 means upwards changes in income
growth and welfare;
2. In column 3, “below” means the solutions in different
government policy schemes are below the social optima;
“equal” means that all of the results are equal to the
social optima.
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Table 1.2 Numerical results
α = 0.75, δ = 0.2, ρ = 0.8, v = 0.1, A = 2.2978, θ = 0.5
Cases Fertility Per child Growth Welfare Tax Subsidy Equivalent
rate education rate level rate rate payment
/output (%) (%)
β = 0.1
no government 3.390 0.047 0.692 3.211 − − 59.6
birth control/birth tax 1.111 0.144 2.124 4.214 0.31 − 24.2
income tax & subsidy 3.390 0.111 1.556 4.077 0.26 0.68 28.5
birth tax & subsidy 1.111 0.338 3.000 5.080 0.26 0.58 benchmark
β = 0.3
no government 3.201 0.057 0.916 3.561 − − 46.2
birth control/birth tax 1.111 0.165 2.263 4.429 0.28 − 17.7
income tax & subsidy 3.201 0.117 1.643 4.212 0.24 0.63 24.2
birth tax & subsidy 1.111 0.338 3.000 5.080 0.23 0.51 benchmark
β = 0.5
no government 2.929 0.073 1.205 3.963 − − 32.2
birth control/birth tax 1.111 0.193 2.425 4.652 0.23 − 11.3
income tax & subsidy 2.929 0.128 1.773 4.391 0.21 0.55 18.8
birth tax & subsidy 1.111 0.338 3.000 5.080 0.19 0.43 benchmark
β = 0.7
no government 2.507 0.103 1.613 4.429 − − 17.7
birth control/birth tax 1.111 0.233 2.618 4.871 0.17 − 5.4
income tax & subsidy 2.507 0.150 1.991 4.638 0.16 0.42 11.7
birth tax & subsidy 1.111 0.338 3.000 5.080 0.14 0.31 benchmark
β = 0.9
no government 1.756 0.186 2.309 4.930 − − 3.8
birth control/birth tax 1.111 0.294 2.856 5.046 0.07 − 0.9
income tax & subsidy 1.756 0.214 2.452 4.964 0.07 0.19 2.9
birth tax & subsidy 1.111 0.338 3.000 5.080 0.06 0.13 benchmark
Notes: a. ‘no government’: competitive solution without government intervention; ‘birth con-
trol/birth tax’: competitive solutions with either the birth control or the birth tax for lump-sum
transfers; ‘income tax & subsidy’: competitive solution with education subsidies financed by income
taxes; ‘birth tax & subsidy’: socially optimal competitive solution with birth taxes for education
subsidies. b. ‘Equivalent payment’: percentage change in income we should add to a non-benchmark
case in every period so as to reach the same welfare level in the first-best benchmark case.
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Income growth, health expenditure, education
investment: the effects on population growth
Abstract
This paper incorporates mortality variable into the endogenous growth model,
where agents choose between consumption, fertility choice, human capital invest-
ment and health investment to prolong life span. The result suggests that health
investment increases along with income growth; fertility rate increases first and
declines steadily toward the steady state level as the survival rate of agents rises
with increasing health investment. A subsidy on health care triggers a faster
decline in fertility rate and leads to an increase in children’s education, and hence
income growth.
Keywords: Health investment; Fertility; Growth;
JEL classification: J13; O11; H23; I30
1. Introduction
Two of the most salient aspects of the process of economic growth are the decline in
both fertility and mortality, and the growth of investment in human capital. These
phenomena are observed in both long-term historical data for countries that developed
early as well as broadly, and in more accelerated form, in the post-World War II period.
For example, over the 19th century, life expectancy at birth in England rose from 37.3 to
48.2 years, and by 1930, it had reached 60.8. The average number of years of schooling
rose from 2.3 for the cohort born in 1801-1805 to 9.1 for the cohort born 1897-1906
(Livi-Bacci, 1997). Averaging across lower income countries, life expectancy at birth
rose from 42.2 in 1950 to 63.3 in 1990. Gross secondary school enrollment increased
from 17.1 percent in 1960 to 46.9 percent in 1990 (World Bank, 2000).
The link between demographic transition and economic growth has been explored
in several recent studies. Mortality fell directly because of higher incomes (which led
to better nutrition) and because of advances in health technology. Mortality decline
in turn, triggered the process of demographic transition, in which, with a varying lag,
fertility fell. The increase in human capital accumulation has been attributed to an
increase in the return to schooling (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1996; Mincer, 1996). Higher
investment in human capital has in turn been linked to changes in fertility behavior,
via a quality-quantity tradeoff (Becker and Lewis, 1973); to an increase in the growth
rate of technology (Lucas, 1988); and directly to a higher level of output (Mankiw et al,
1992).
Lower mortality implies a higher rate of return to education, as the declining child
and youth mortality provides an important incentive to increase investment in education
of each child. Numerous researchers have emphasized that human capital accumulation
is the prime engine for economic growth (e.g. Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988). Recent stud-
ies argue the particular mechanism through which increased survival chances promote
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growth by raising the human capital investment (e.g. De la Croix, Licandro, 1999;
Zhang, J., Zhang J., and Lee R., 2001). It seems to be a logical assumption that
good health raises the economic productivity of individuals and countries’ economic
growth rates. A healthier work force would be related to the human capital accumu-
lation process. Wheeler (1980) finds that significant improvement in health increases
labor productivity and income. Currais and Rivera (1997) analyze the role of health
attainment in human capital accumulation. They estimate a conditional convergence
regression that indicates the importance of this variable in growth analysis. Results
demonstrate that investment in health contributes significantly to explaining variations
in output through human capital. Behrman (1990) and Fogel (1994) argue that good
health raises living standards directly, implying that good health is consistent with in-
come level and promotes higher income growth.
The effect of mortality on education has been investigated both empirically and
theoretically. Ram and Schultz (1979) argue that improvements in mortality were an
important incentive to increase investment in education, and that post-war experience
of India was consistent with this incentive effect being significant. Meltzer (1992) argues
that the elasticity of enrollment with respect to rate of return was sufficiently large
that mortality induced increases in returns could indeed explain large movements in
enrollments, and further raised the return to investments in schooling. Ehrlich and Lui
(1991) show that exogenous declines in mortality reduce fertility, raise human capital
investment in children and stimulate growth in positive old-age material support from
children to old parents.
Galor and Weil (1999, 2000), and Galor and Moav (2002) argue that demographic
transition was triggered by an increase in the return to education that was brought
about by the acceleration of technological progress in the aftermath of the industrial
revolution. The rise in the return to skills induced a quantity-quality trade-off and a
demographic transition and therefore a fertility decline. The theory appears consistent
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with the significant increase in the investment in education prior to the fertility decline
in most of the developed world. Another theory attributes demographic transition to
the decline in the gender wage gap. Galor and Weil (1996) show that higher wages for
woman raise the cost of children relatively more than they raise household income, and
lead to a reduction in the number of children that couples choose to have. Their model is
consistent with the empirical results in the studies such as Heckman and Walker (1990),
who show a negative effect of women’s wages on birth rates. Studies found that family
planning programs explain only 10-40 percent of the decline in fertility in developing
countries and the rest of the decline is explained by the changes in desired fertility, i.e.,
number of children families wanted to have (Weil, 2001).
Some studies suggest that health spending has been rising along with the income per
capita and the share of health expenditure has been increasing as a percentage to GDP
in developed countries, hence the mortality should be endogenized with income growth
models. For example, Jones (2003) shows that income growth leads consumption and
health spending to rise, and the marginal utilities of consumption and health spending
to fall. But saturation occurs faster in consumption than in health spending. As people
grow richer, consumption rises but they devote an increasing share of resources to health
care. An inevitable issue in dealing with the relations among longevity, social security
and growth is how to treat the saving left by agents who die before reaching old age.
This issue is abstracted in Ehrlich and Lui (1991) which assumes implicitly that these
savings are wasted. On the contrary, in the presence of actuarially fair annuity markets
that channel saving to physical accumulation, the returns on life-cycle saving are divided
among savors who survive to old agents (Zhang et al, 2001).
In general, these studies combine different regimes of population and economic growth
within a single model. Mortality is not incorporated into these models and fertility
transition comes as a result of a quality-quantity trade-off via technological progress,
which then causes sustained growth in income. Therefore it is important to investigate
39
the effect of mortality on fertility together with its implication for economic growth.
In this paper, we incorporate both mortality and fertility into an endogenous growth
model, to investigate the effect of income growth on mortality and fertility; and eventu-
ally the effects of changing patterns of mortality and fertility on human capital invest-
ment and income growth.
The findings show that the fertility rate is related with the health spending through
its effects on the rate of survival and income. Fertility and population growth increase
first and with a time lag fall with the increasing survival rate. We also discuss the effect
of government health subsidy on fertility, which shows that subsidy on health spending
triggers the process of fertility transition, and promotes income growth.
The rest of the paper is is the following order: section 2 presents the model and
assumptions, section 3 discusses the dynamics of the model and the proposed theoretical
approaches on the fertility change. Section 4 shows that case with government health
subsidy; section 5 and 6 give the numerical simulations and conclusion.
2. The Model
The economy consists of overlapping generations of identical agents who live for three
periods: young, middle age and old age. Agents accumulate human capital when they
are young, retire when old; work in the middle age. Each middle-aged agent is endowed
with one unit of time. Survival is complete through young age to adulthood, and survival
to old age is uncertain at a rate of p, which is an increasing and concave function of
health capital Mt. The number of middle-aged agents living in period t is devoted as
Lt. Each middle-aged agent chooses to give birth to nt of children, and must devote a
fixed v units of time to rearing children (0 < v < 1); and supplies lt = 1 − vnt labor
time in production. Agents make decisions on life-cycle saving (s), investment in health
(m), and investment in the education of their children (q).
The altruistic middle-aged agent’s utility, Ut is defined over middle-age consumption,
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c1(t), old-age consumption, c2(t+1); the utility from the companionship of his/her chil-
dren1, which depends on both the quantity (nt) and the quality (ht+1) of the children

















where σ, ξ are the inverse values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in con-
sumption; the subjective discount factors δ1, δ2, measure the rate of time preferences.
Since the survival to old age is uncertain, the expected benefits to the surviving old
parent in (1) are constrained by the rate of survival p, which depends on the health
capital Mt.






where mt is the private investment on health and m¯t is the average public spending of
health care that is associated with individuals’ health status, M0 refers to the initial
endowment of health capital. Am > 0 indicates the effectiveness of the health care
technology, and 0 < θ < 1 is the share parameter of private investment on health capital
accumulation, which indicates the relative importance of an individual’s health spending
versus the average health spending in the economy. One rationale for the inclusion of the
average health investment in the formation of health capital is that when there is little
spending on health on average, there would be a lack of health care professionals and
health care facilities as in many poor countries. In this scenario, health care spending
by a single agent can hardly enhance his health status; and transmittable diseases can
easily turn into outbreaks of epidemics which lead to low survival rate. The endowed
component of health capital reflects the fact that there would still be a chance to survive
to old age even without health care spending.
1We follow Erhlich and Lui (1991) to add the utility of companionship due to a sense of family
strength and influence; which is a basic motive of having children by the altruistic parents.
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The assumptions on the health capital is difficult to define. Practically, isolating how
much public health spending goes directly to produce individual health capital is almost
impossible, as public expenditure on health care facilities, training of medicare personnel,
investment on new technology of health care and medicine, etc., are all contributing to
the quality supply of health care, and hence personal health capital. For the convenience
of analyzing, we follow Kalmeli-Ozcan (2002), Kalmeli-Ozcan et al (2000), and zhang et
al (2006) to assume a Cobb-Douglas production function for the health capital.
The rate of survival from young to old depends on health capital Mt
2:
pt = 1− exp(−Mt), 0 < pt < 1. (3)
which is increasing and concave in health capital.




1−η, D > 0, 0 < η < 1. (4)
where lt and ht are per worker labor input and human capital respectively. Ay > 0 is the
productivity parameter and 0 < η < 1 is the share parameter associated with physical
capital in final production.






where ht+1 is the human capital of the child, ht is the human capital of parent, and qt
is parent’s material investment in children’s human capital. Ah > 0 is the productivity
parameter in education and 0 < η < 1 is the share parameter of education investment.
In period t, a middle-aged agent devotes vnt units of time to rearing children, and
the remaining lt ≡ 1−vnt units of time to earning wage income. The middle-aged agent
2Following Tang and Zhang (2005), we assume that the survival rate is a Logit function of health
capital, which guarantees a concave and increasing effect of health capital on the rate of survival; and
the increment in survival rate lowers as the health capital increases further. Similar setup is also adopted
in Kalemli-Ozcan (2002).
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allocates his/her earnings to his/her middle age consumption, saves the amount of St and
invests the saving through an actuarially fair annuity market for old age consumption;
invests on children’s education and when they are old, enjoys the companionship of
children. The individual’s budget constraints are:
c1(t) = wtht(1− vnt)− St −mt − ntqt, (6)
c2(t+1) = (1 + rt+1)St/p¯t, (7)
where w and r are the wage rate and interest rate, respectively. Note that life expectancy
affects life-cycle consumption and returns to saving through the time preferences (δ1 and
δ2 in equation (1)) and the budget constraint (7). In (7), old-age survivors share the
saving of agents who die before an expected rate of return (1 + rt+1)/p¯t, as the savings
are annuitized.
We assume markets are perfectly competitive and physical capital depreciates fully
in one period. Let et = Kt/(Ltltht) be the ratio of physical capital to effective labor,
which must be equal across firms in equilibrium. Factors are paid by their marginal
products:
wt = (1− η)Ayeηt , (8)
1 + rt = ηAye
η−1
t . (9)
The labor and capital markets clear when:
lt = 1− vnt, (10)
Kt+1 = LtSt. (11)
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3. Result with funded social security
Taken as given (rt+1, wt, ht, m¯t, p¯t), agent chooses {St,mt, nt, qt} to maximize the utility
in (1), subject to the law of motion of human capital in (5).
By substituting the functional form of health investment in (2) into the survival
function in (3), and plug the term of budget constraint and the law of motion of human
capital into the utility function, the individual agent’s constrained problem has been
transferred to an unconstrained one, as formulated below:
maxLt =
1
1− σ [wtht(1− vnt)− St −mt − ntqt]
1−σ
+

















The first-order conditions for the household problem are given below for σ ∈ (0, 1)








= δ1(1 + rt+1), (13)
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Equation (13) is the arbitrage condition for intertemporal consumption, which shows
the amount of current consumption that an adult would like to substitute for the old age
consumption at a rate that is determined by the time preference and the rate of return
on physical capital.
In equation (14), the marginal utility foregone from giving up wthtv + qt units of
consumption for an additional child is compensated by the marginal utility obtained
by having this child. In equation (15), the marginal utility foregone from giving up an
additional unit of consumption to invest in children’s education, equals the marginal







= c−σ1t nt(vwtht + qt)/βδ2pt, and substitutes this condition back
into (15), we can solve for qt:
qt =
αγv
β − αγwtht (17)
which means that the optimal investment in children’s human capital is independent
of fertility, savings and the health investment if the motive of having children is for
companionship. This is consistent with Ehrlich and Lui (1990), that intergenerational
trade introduces an added incentive for investing in children that is independent of
the magnitude of emotional benefits due to companionship or unconditional altruism
(which implicitly assumes β > α). These two equations represent the rate of return on
the number of children and on the education investment on children respectively; the
returns on the quantity and quality of children will change with the optimum values of
fertility rate n and the per child education investment q along with the increasing rate
of survival as income level increases. As the per child education investment is a constant
proportion of wage income, the opportunity cost of having children will increase along
with the rise in income per capita; lower fertility means higher proportion of labour
time available for production, which will in turn increases output level. In this sense,
therefore, higher income leads to an quality-quantity trade-off.
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And (16) shows that the loss in marginal utility by consuming less to invest in health
capital equals to the marginal benefit obtained from the old-age consumption with a
prolonged life span, which depends on the old-age consumption derived from saving and
the companionship from his/her children. It indicates the condition at which the agent
is indifferent from the decision on how much to invest in health capital.












By plugging in the first-order condition in equation (13), and combined with the







αγ(1− ξ) . (19)
This condition links the dynamics of investment in health capital with saving (or the old-
age consumption) and the investment in children’s education qt. The health investment
prolongs the lifespan of individual agent through the survival function in (3); but this
investment in health capital is subject to his/her total saving and the total education
investment in children as shown in the above equation. The evolution of the dynamics
is described here: initially, when private investment on health care and the productivity
of health care technology are very low, the rate of survival of population was relatively
low, hence saving and total human capital investment were both at a relatively low
level. With the progress in production and technology, the health investment rises
with income growth and the improvements in health technology, the survival rate of
population rises, which induces a higher level of saving and investment on human capital
as people anticipate a longer old-age period of consumption.
Updating the rate of return on physical capital in (9) by one period, and using the
market clearing condition in (11), we have:







And deriving from the budget constraint of the middle-age agent in (6), equilibrium



























The evolution of the economy is determined by a sequence {St,mt, nt, qt}∞t=0 that
satisfies (5), (6), (7) and equations (20)-(22), while taking {ht, wt, rt} as given. Solving
the analytical equilibrium results under this model is intractable, but we can show the
evolution of the economy by the properties that characterize the first-order conditions
and the constraints of the economy. The equilibrium fertility rate n is a function of
income and optimum level of survival p(y) which depends on the level of income as well,
thus we denote this relation as n(p(y)).
We now show the dynamics of fertility under this model. Suppose in the steady state,
the sequence of solution is given by {S∗t ,m∗t , n∗t , q∗t }; the corresponding survival rate is
hence p∗t by plugging in the equilibrium solution of private investment in health capital
m∗t . Take the full differentiation of the first-order conditions in (20)-(22) with respect




















































1− β(1− ξ) + (1− η)(1− σ)
1− η(1− σ) ,
∆4 =
σ − 1
1− η(1− σ) ,
∆5 =
(1− η)(1− σ)







l = 1− vn.
Equation (23) is a non-homogenous nonlinear differential equation, solving n as a
function of p would be theoretical difficult, but we can roughly find out the sign of
the differential. According to assumption n is strictly positive, and the survival rate p,
satisfies p ∈ (0, 1). Hence, the first part of RHS of (23), denoted as X1, is monotonically
decreasing as p increases, and the second part of the RHS of (23), denoted as X2,
is a monotonic increasing function in p, therefore the sign of dn/dpt depends on the
magnitudes within the terms of X1 and X2 and parameter values. X1 contains the effects
that are interdetermined by the rate of survival, fertility choices, education investment
and human capital level, which means that the change in fertility is interdetermined not
only by mortality decline (as in Schultz, 1997) but also by education investment and
technology progress (as in Galor and Weil (1999, 2000) and Galor and Moav (2002)). X2
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depends purely on rate of survival. Hence in our model, the changes in fertility pattern
are the combined effects of those factors that have been stressed in previous studies on
fertility declines.
The difference between these two parts is initially positive at low survival levels and
becomes negative as p increases. Due to the complicity of assumptions and functional
forms of the model, it is difficult to get the Hessian Metrics of the model; thus, we
cannot derive the explicit expression of d2n/dp2t from the first order conditions given in
(20)-(22). However, with the numerical simulation for appropriate parameterizations,
we can actually find that the sign for dn/dpt is initially positive with low survival levels,
and becomes negative until the level of survival rate is sufficiently high. In other words,
the relationship between fertility rate and the rate of survival exhibits a hump-shaped
pattern, and so does the population growth rate. However, the explicit rate of survival at
which fertility started to decline, is difficult to be solved analytically with the non-linear
feature of our model, and depends on the values of parameters when make numerical
simulation. We provide a graph that plots the evolution of dn/dpt in Figure 2.1 and
Figure 2.2.
The intuition is that, on the one hand, when the income level is low, survival rate
is also low due to the low health investment. Parents choose to have more children
as a “replacement strategy” to maximize their utilities, where the changes in mortality
are more important in the determination of fertility choices. On the other hand, the
rate of return on quantity of children is higher than that on the quality of children as
the investment of human capital is low. As the income level grows, the survival rate
rises with higher health investment, agent tends to invest more children’s education to
receive higher old-age consumption; since the rate of return on education is triggered
by the acceleration in the rise in human capital and technology progress. At this stage,
the return on education plays an important role relative to the role of survival rate on
fertility choice.
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The result presented here is consistent with population growth that fertility rate
initially rises with increased survival rate and falls with a lag to the mortality decline,
which is featured as demographic transition. And the evolution of the change in fertility
in our model also represents the evidences that are in line with theories appeared in
previous studies. And the fertility transition is also triggered by the increase in the return
to education that was brought about by the acceleration of technological progress in the
aftermath of the industrial revolution, discussed in Galor and Weil (1999, 2000), Galor
and Moav (2002). The increase in the return to education induced a quantity-quality
tradeoff and a demographic transition.
We can now proceed further to discuss the evolution of the economy by analyzing
the dynamics of income levels. Implicitly, we can write the one-period iterated form of






















The income growth comes from positive human capital and physical capital forma-
tion, and negative population growth, that are the results of the quality-quantity tradeoff
due to increased survival rates. Unfortunately, solving the difference equation given in
(24) is analytically intractable. The sign of the slope of (24) is ambiguous as discussed
in Appendix B, the evolution of income growth can give different equilibrium results de-
pending on the parameter values. Figure 2.3 shows the possible equilibrium outcomes.
One of these possible cases is the two steady-state case: a stable low income steady
state, and an unstable growth steady state, above which persistent growth is achieved.
The survival function in our model is assumed to be concave in income and asymp-
totes to 1 at higher levels of income per capita, and given the hump-shaped pattern
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of fertility and population growth as a function of survival rate (higher returns to ed-
ucation), the population growth is thus a hump-shaped function of income per capita
with appropriate parameter restrictions. Under this, there will be two steady states.
At low levels of income per capita, the survival chances are low. Therefore, an increase
in the survival probability, as a result of an increase in income per capita, leads to an
increase in the rate of population growth. This results in lower income per capita via
the dilution of resources per effective labor to lower production levels. This is the stable
low-income steady state. At high levels of income per capita, the survival chances are
high, so further increases in the survival probability cause population growth to decline
via decreased fertility. This, together with the increased level of human capital invest-
ment, leads to higher income per capita and growth. With declining fertility rate at high
levels of income per capita, there is sustained growth beyond the growth steady state.
4. Results under government health subsidy
In the previous section, we have discussed the general equilibrium outcomes under com-
petitive market, we now consider the effects of government subsidy on private health
spending on survival rate, fertility rate, and the rate of growth of income per capita.
Suppose that the government subsidies both health spending by imposing an wage
income tax on each agent. The individual’s budget constraints become:
c1(t) = wtht(1− vnt)(1− τw)− St −mt(1− pim)− ntqt,
c2(t+1) = (1 + rt+1)St/p¯t.
The health spending is subsidized at rates pim, which is funded by a wage income tax
τw. The government’s budget is balanced when:
τwwtht(1− vnt) = mtpim. (25)
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Rearrange the equations together with the assumptions, the first-order conditions finally


























(β − αγ) wtht.
Similar to the outcomes as presented in the competitively equilibrium, these con-
ditions in (30)-(32) show the interactions between survival rate, fertility, saving, and
investment in human capital. Government subsidy on health spending improves the
health care status, which leads to higher survival rate. Anticipating a longer life, the
utility gain from the third period is relatively larger, resulting in an increased resource
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allocation for third period utility. Which has two components, one is the utility de-
rived from his/her old-age consumption on saving, and the other is the companionship
(both quantity and quality) of children. Resource allocations should be made between
these two parts together with the intertemporal choices. Again, due to the complexity
of the non-linear feature of the model, solving these equations with analytical solu-
tions is intractable. We present simulation results that use appropriate parameter set
up, to mimic the nature of the dynamics of the model. The simulation results show
that, initially when the income level and survival rate are low, agent chooses to have
more children and gives up saving as a substitute. As the survival rate increases with
income level (also higher investment in health capital), relative return is higher from
living longer, the demand for own old-age consumption tends to grow higher relative
to the companionship, therefore, the way of reallocation of resource has changed. With
an expectation of longer live, individual will substitute the companionship of children
(i.e., less children) for saving, which leads to fertility transition and higher investment.
This is the substitution effect, which is accelerated by higher spending on health capital
induced by government health subsidy. By choosing to have less children, there will be
more labor time available to earn wage income, which in turn leads to higher investment
children’s education or human capital; and eventually it will generate higher income
growth. Hence these effects present a income effect from the lower fertility. The details
of the results are given in the next section.
5. Numerical results
In our dynamic model, a period has a length of 25 years, consequently the dynamics of
the model are to be interpreted as changes which occur over a horizon of a century or
more.
To reveal the quantitative implications of the model, we make numerical simulations
with plausible parameterizations. With which, we want to pay special interest in the
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interactions between fertility, mortality and income growth over time, as these factors
are interdetermined with each other. In addition, we want to see the growth and welfare
implications of subsidies on health spending. Due to the complexity of the model, these
questions are difficult to answer analytically.
On the technical side, the system if the nonlinear equations determines the following
variables:
(c1t, c2t+1,mt, qt,Mt, ht, kt+1, yt, pt, nt, rt, wt, τw).
With this system of equations, we can update the state variables (kt, ht,Mt−1) to (kt+1,
ht+1,Mt), and calculate 1 + rt+1 = ηAye
η−1
t+1 to evaluate old-age consumption c2t+1 and
welfare V .
The parameterizations assume that α = 0.5, β = 0.8, γ = η = 0.33, δ1 = 0.6,
δ2 = 0.4, θ = 0.5, σ = 0.85, ξ = 0.85, Am = 0.8, Ah = 4, Ay = 4, M0 = 0.2,
k0 = 0.6328, and h0 = 4. In which, the share parameter of physical capital (γ, and η)
in production with a value of 1/3 is widely used in the literature. The discount rate for
the future consumption, δ1 = 0.6 is taken based on the single period discount rate found
by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), which is 0.98. Since we set 25 years correspond to
the length of a single generation, the discount rate for each generation in our model is
selected to be: δ1 = 0.6 = 0.98
25. The second discount rate δ2 in the utility function,
measures how much the altruistic parents discount their utility gains from both the
number, and the education of children. We let it to be lower than the discount factor
on future consumption (δ1). Therefore, δ2 is set at a value of 0.4, which is similar to
that in Beck et al (1990), and Ehrlich and Lui (1991). Other parameters, Am, Ah,
Ay, M0, k0, and h0 are chosen to make the fertility rate and surviving probability to
be realistic; the values of θ, σ, ξ are consistent with the appropriate parameterizations
in the literature (Beck et al (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)). The simulation
results are presented in Table 2.1 and 2.2. As discussed in the previous section, there
would have several equilibria within the dynamic system. Here, we present the case
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which is directly linked to the evolution between fertility, mortality and income growth
proposed in the previous text.
Table 2.1, reports the simulation results for an equilibrium with a relatively higher
mortality rate, which has already crossed over the low-income unstable trap, moved
to the sustained growth path. The initial public provision on health (M0) is set at a
relatively higher level that equals to 0.2. The seven columns in this Table report in a
sequence, of fertility rate, health spending, education spending per child, rate of survival,
output per worker, growth rate, and the welfare, respectively. Starting from the first
period, the fertility rate initially increases as the health spending, survival rate, and
income level; and after several periods, as the survival rate has reached high relatively
high level, fertility rate starts to decline. The education spending per child, was low
with the low income level and increases faster as income level rises.
Table 2.2 shows that how the subsidy on health spending affects the fertility transition
process. The private health spending in each period, is higher than that without health
subsidy, an induced increase resulted from the health subsidy. The overall magnitude
of fertility is smaller than that without subsidy, that is, with the subsidy on health, the
highest rate of fertility is less than the competitive equilibrium. Saving declines first and
rises later but rises earlier before fertility starts to decline. Both factors are linked to the
substitution effect with higher survival rate induced by the subsidy on health spending.
We can also observe that the timing of the fertility transition has been brought forward
in the case with health subsidy, a faster transition due to the health subsidy. Finally, the
income growth rate and level of welfare in Table 2.2 are higher for each period relative
to those in Table 2.1, the competitive results.
6. Conclusion
The reasons for demographic transition have been discussed in the literature with many
competing theories, that may due to mortality decline, which is in response to the
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improved survival chances of offsprings; or due to the adverse effect of opportunity cost
resulted from higher income level; others may attribute the transition to higher returns
to education investment that induce the quantity-quality tradeoff.
We present a model that takes both fertility and mortality endogenized by imposing
a specific linkage between health investment and mortality level to discuss the evolution
between fertility, mortality, and income growth. Our model and numerical solutions
indicate implicitly the combination of the effects of increasing health spending leading
a higher survival rate, higher opportunity cost with higher income level, can all be
attributed to the fertility transition. However, we show further that a government
subsidy on health spending triggers the fertility transition, accelerates income growth,
and improves welfare.
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It follows that limyt→ 0 yt+1 = 0 as limyt→ 0 pt = 0; and limyt→∞ yt+1 =∞ as limyt→∞ pt =
1 and limyt→∞ St = ∞. But the evolution of output may be complicated with the
interactions between survival rate and fertility, as well as human capital investment and
saving decisions. Since the survival rate is monotonically increasing with income level
by assumption, dp
dyt
> 0, and the sign of dn
dp
is ambiguous, hence the sign of ϕ′ is also
ambiguous depending on the parameter values and the relative magnitudes with the
terms Z1 and Z2 in (34) .
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Table 2.1 Simulated results - case of sustainable growth
Parameterization: α = 0.5, β = 0.8, γ = η = 0.33, δ1 = 0.6, δ2 = 0.4, θ = 0.5, σ = 0.85, ξ = 0.85
v = 0.1, Am = 0.8, Ah = 4, Ay = 4, M0 = 0.2, k0 = 0.6328, h0 = 4
Period Fertility Health Education Rate of Output per Growth Welfare
rate spending spending survival worker rate (%)
0 1.1109 1.3203 0.1578 0.6014 8.00 − 13.3799
1 1.1957 1.7827 0.2365 0.7715 11.87 1.58 14.8682
2 1.2597 2.2338 0.3418 0.8407 17.03 1.46 16.2596
3 1.3081 2.6938 0.4919 0.8897 24.37 1.44 17.5758
4 1.3418 3.1628 0.7096 0.9242 35.02 1.46 18.8532
5 1.3619 3.6378 0.9482 0.9481 50.57 1.48 20.1158
6 1.3697 4.1163 1.2924 0.9647 73.42 1.50 21.3839
7 1.3672 4.5971 2.1770 0.9759 107.12 1.52 22.6759
8 1.3565 5.0800 3.1877 0.9837 157.06 1.54 24.0078
9 1.3392 5.5644 4.6856 0.9889 231.31 1.56 25.3937
10 1.2913 6.5424 10.2404 0.9949 508.33 1.60 28.3766
11 1.2630 7.0357 15.2267 0.9965 758.30 1.61 29.9964
12 1.2330 7.5327 22.7297 0.9977 1135.85 1.63 31.7164
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Table 2.2 Simulated results - case with health spending subsidy
Parameterization: α = 0.5, β = 0.8, γ = η = 0.33, δ1 = 0.6, δ2 = 0.4, θ = 0.5, σ = 0.85, ξ = 0.85
v = 0.1, Am = 0.8, Ah = 4, Ay = 4, M0 = 0.2, k0 = 0.6328, h0 = 4
Period Fertility Health Education Rate of Output per Growth Welfare
rate spending spending survival worker rate (%)
pim=20%
0 1.0450 1.3867 0.1575 0.6014 8.00 − 13.5463
1 1.1133 1.8713 0.2377 0.7871 12.04 1.55 15.0848
2 1.1576 2.3475 0.3462 0.8546 17.44 1.49 16.4393
3 1.1854 2.8367 0.5025 0.9016 25.25 1.49 17.7005
4 1.1996 3.3372 0.7330 0.9341 36.77 1.51 19.0420
5 1.2027 3.8441 1.0752 0.9561 53.91 1.54 20.2213
6 1.1969 4.3540 1.5858 0.9708 79.57 1.57 21.4957
7 1.1843 4.8651 2.3505 0.9806 118.12 1.59 22.8126
8 1.1664 5.3770 3.5004 0.9871 176.25 1.61 24.1714
9 1.1449 5.8903 5.2361 0.9815 264.29 1.63 25.6036
10 1.1207 6.4046 7.8667 0.9943 398.14 1.65 27.1164
11 1.0945 6.9216 11.8693 0.9963 602.50 1.67 28.7215
12 1.0671 7.4415 17.9851 0.9975 915.75 1.69 30.4303
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Figure 2.1 Fertility change in response to change 












   
       Figure 2.3 The evolution of income per capita 
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Population aging, welfare, intergenerational
transfers - the pension needs of an elderly society:
the case of China
Abstract
This paper briefly reviews the cause of aging due to changing demography,
and the changing of population age distribution. It also makes a short survey on
the economic consequences caused by aging, i.e., the interactions between aging,
saving and intergenerational wealth transfers, and how these factors response to
unfunded and funded pension systems. With special attention on China’s aging
problem, this paper also reviews the features of China’s pension systems under
the planned economy and the new market-oriented economy; and reports the pro-
jections on aging and the financial needs for pension in China.
Keywords: Fertility; Growth; Social security and Public Pensions
JEL classification: J13; O11; H55
1. Introduction
The populations of Western countries are rapidly aging. In the U.S., for example, the
share of people over the age of 65 was 9.8 percent in 1970, 12.5 percent in 1990, and
12.8 percent in 2000; it is expected to increase to more than 22 percent in 2030 (see
U.S. Bureau of Census, 2002). Similarly, in OECD countries this share was 18 percent
in 1990, projected to grow to around 31 percent by 2030, according to the World Bank
Development Report (2002). The situation is not significantly different in developing
countries; in the past 50 years the world’s average life expectancy at birth has increased
from 46 to 66 years (UN, 2002). China is one of the developing countries that will be
experiencing a rapid aging problem in the near future. The percentage of people aged
65 and over in China reached 7 percent in 2000, which indicated that China has become
an aging society. Projections show that this share will be higher than 20 percent in 2050
(UN, 1998).
Numerous studies have discussed the problem of aging and its political and economic
implications. It has been recognized that the sharp increase in expected longevity in
the near future may have profound policy effects. Attention has mostly focused on the
need to reform the social security system, whose current arrangement, pay-as-you-go
(PAYG), has been viewed as unsustainable in view of population aging. In developed
countries, with safety net extending “from cradle to death”, aging of the population may
also have adverse effect on economic growth. Moreover, there are concerns about the
political effects of aging: as the voting population becomes older, the political pressure
to tilt the composition of social spending in favor of the elderly may increase. Contrarily,
the public expenditure on the young could decrease.
This paper contains mainly two parts. The first part reviews briefly the changing
demographic patterns that induce aging as well as the pace of aging; how are the changing
demography and aging linked to economic growth. It further reviews the theoretical and
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empirical works on the interactions between individuals’ choices on consumption, saving
and investment, and health care resulted in an expected rising longevity, and also how
do these changes affect economic growth.
The second part shows the facts of changing demography, and the aging process in
China. It discusses the possible adverse effects resulted by aging as China is still a low
income country but has to face the aging problem that is typically characterized by
the rich industrial countries. With a realistic concern of its pension scheme currently
implemented, there are several papers represented various projections on the future
pension demands, and the financing of the pension funds and related rate of contributions
for the current working cohorts. We report some of these results and propose some
reforms to China’s old age security system.
2. Population growth, aging and economic develop-
ment
2.1. Population in transition
The world population has seen remarkable changes in the last two centuries. Before the
industrial revolution, the population growth followed a pattern of higher birth rate, high
death rate, and low natural increase rate. However, as living conditions improved with
modernization, the demographic patterns started to change. In European countries, the
death rates, especially the infant and child mortality rates declined after the Industrial
Revolution, as the hygienic and medical conditions had been largely improved. The
birth rates had, though with an obvious lag, fallen ultimately as well. This process
of transferring from high birth rate, high death rate and low population growth to a
pattern of low birth rate, low death rate, and hence a low rate of population growth is
called “demographic transition”. Most of the European countries and other high income
countries had completed their demographic transitions in the nineteenth century or early
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twentieth century.
In the twentieth century, advanced development in modern medical and public health
programmes have improved the health status of the population in developing countries.
These programmes were the immunization or vaccine for epidemic diseases at low costs,
the wider use of antibiotics, the easier access to hospitals, and so on. Similar to that
of the advanced countries, the demographic pattern of less developed regions has also
changed. Mortality rate declined first, and fertility rate fell with a lag of twenty or
more years to mortality declines in most of the developing countries. At present, among
the developing countries, some have completed the demographic transition (e.g., China)
while others are in the process or at the starting stage of the transition; but overall,
fertility rates have fallen gradually, and population growth has slowed down in developing
countries in the last few decades.
Demographers and economists have paid extensive attention on the relationship be-
tween population growth and economic development, there exists an enormous volume
of literature on it. There are also a large number of studies trying to explore the fac-
tors that determine the demographic transition. Among them, Becker and Barro (1988),
Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) initiated the discussions on families’ fertility choices
with an endogenous model where altruistic parents face the trade-off between the qual-
ity and the quantity of children. With human capital accumulation, they argued that a
subsistence level of consumption per child can cause multiple equilibria in the trade-off
between the quantity and the quality of children. When initial human capital is low rel-
ative to subsistence consumption, the rate of return on human capital is low, and hence
parents choose a large number of children and make no education investment, which is
typical in a low-welfare model economy with high fertility choice and low levels of human
capital and growth. When initial human capital is high, subsistence consumption be-
comes negligible, and hence parents choose a small number of children and invest in their
education, leading to sustainable economic growth, which is a high-welfare model econ-
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omy with low fertility and high levels of capital and economic growth. Tamura (1991),
discussed altruism parents in a model of income differentials with parents’ choice of fam-
ily size, investments in children’s human capital and consumption, is an extension the
Becker et al (1990) argument. Both models show that higher income growth leads to
higher investment in human capital, which in turn induces a quality-quantity trade-off
towards the former, and hence a lower population growth and demographic transition.
Galor and Weil (1999, 2000), and Galor and Moav (2002) argue that demographic
transition was triggered by an increase in the return to education that was brought
about by the acceleration of technological progress in the aftermath of the industrial
revolution. The rise in the return to skills induced a quantity-quality trade-off and a
demographic transition and therefore a fertility decline. The theory appears consistent
with the significant increase in the investment in education prior to the fertility decline
in most of the developed world.
Mortality decline is another important factor that is linked to demographic transition.
Mortality fell directly because of higher incomes with improvements in nutrition and
health care. Because of advances in health technology, the chances of survival of young
people, triggers the process of demographic transition, in which, with a varying lag,
fertility fell. Higher surviving chances may affect the ability for young population to
absorb future investment in intellectual capital which leads to higher human capital
accumulation. To the extent that such investments increase the life span, particularly
the years over which a person can be economically active, such an increase in quality
will raise the return to investments in human capital. Increases in longevity, particularly
of an individual’s economically productive years, increase the amount of human time
available without increasing population; such an increase would tend to lower value of
time per unit, but, as we know, most of the effects of better health care and nutrition
occur in childhood and enhance the quality of a unit of time in later years more than
increasing the number of children. Studies have shown that the increase in human capital
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accumulation has been attributed to an increase in the return to schooling (Foster and
Rosenzweig, 1996; Mincer, 1996).
However, the post demographic transition population growth rates are persistently
low in industrialized countries, and these populations are aging. The median age and
the proportion of the population that is elderly are increasing; at the same time, the
fraction of the population that is young, is falling over time. And due to the dramatic
declines in fertility that took place after World War II in industrialized countries, the
population is aging at an ever faster pace. Consequently, the aging problem is likely to
affect the economy more radically than it used to be as was initially addressed certain
years ago. Hence, understanding the sources of aging and its impacts on the economy
becomes extremely important.
2.2. Aging, economic growth, and pension: A Survey
2.2..1 Source of aging
The problem of population aging for a closed population is resulted from two sources -
an increase in the age at which people die, and a decrease in the rate at which births
take place. An increase in longevity raises the average age of the population by raising
the number of years in which each individual is old relative to the number in which he or
she is young. A decrease in fertility raises the average age of the population by changing
the relative numbers of population who are young and those who are old. A decrease in
fertility, also lowers the rate at which population grows.
Population aging changes the fraction of the population made up of non-productive
dependents, low population growth has reduced the burden of youth dependency, but
will increase the burden of old age dependency. Cutler et al (1990) show that slower
population growth reduced the fraction of output that must be devoted to producing new
capital. Fewer new workers means lower investment requirement and more consumption.
Population aging resulted from declining fertility will also affect the labor market,
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through the changes in the relative weights of different age groups in the labor force; and
through the effects on age-specified wages, labor mobility, and retirement age. Kotlikoff
(1988) finds that wages start off below productivity, but rise above it as workers near
retirement age, which implicitly suggests that population aging will cause a funding
shortfall if the social security is based on the PAYG, since the young workers’ wages,
which are below their marginal products will no longer be able to cover the excess
of older workers’ wages. Population aging may also affect the timing of retirement
decision. Population aging lowers the labor force participation rates, which may push
the governments to postpone the age of retirement as a way to balancing public pension
systems.
2.2..2 Fertility, mortality, and growth: interactions between demographic
factors, social security, and intergenerational wealth transfers
The effects of population aging on economic growth have been widely discussed among
scholars. Recent literature dealing with the aging effect within endogenous growth frame-
work often provide a more detailed and sophisticated reasoning that incorporates the
interactions of family wealth transfers between generations, family decisions on optimal
fertility choice, human capital investment and consumption, social choice of pension sys-
tem inside the dynamic generational equilibrium; or the interactions with consideration
of mortality decline or gains in human longevity.
2-1 Fertility, longevity, and growth
In most theoretical studies which include human capital as the engine of economic
growth, a common result is that an increase in life expectancy lengthens the period
needed to recover the investments in human capital, which translated into higher re-
turns on individual education or human capital investment. This augmented return
will give rise to higher levels of investments in human capital which in turn will raise
growth rates. Ehrlich and Lui (1991), a pioneering study of longevity and endogenous
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growth, using a three period overlapping generations model to examine the aging affects
on capital accumulation through the channel of changes in family insurance and inter-
generational transfer. The model incorporated the effect of increasing life expectancy
on returns to education (human capital) investments into general equilibrium models;
embedded with the effect of mortality decline in an overlapping generations model in
which children provide old age support for their parents. In this model, improvements
in longevity lower fertility, raise educational investment, and raise the long-run income
growth. In a similar setup, Meltzer (1992) finds that mortality reductions may favor
economic growth by increasing educational investments.
In these papers, individual agents are normally assumed to live for two or three peri-
ods, and identical in proposed features for each specified issue. Some critics argue that
the time horizon under this format is too short. The drastic changes in age structure and
other demographic effects such as demographic transition and aging, may be smoothed
away after generations. Moreover, individual agents are different for two important com-
ponents: the levels and compositions of wealth differ when they are in different ages; and
the propensities to consume out of wealth differ when taking different time horizons in
models examining the dynamic behavior of an economy when agents have finite horizons
(Blanchard, 1985).
Based on Blanchard-Yaari (Blanchard, 1985; Yaari, 1965), Kalemli-Ozcan et al (2000)
develops a continuous time overlapping generations model that considers the optimal
education investment decisions that individual agents may take, under an assumption
of constant probability to death in order to examine the consequence of increased life
expectancy in raising human capital investment while the economy grows. Whereas
declining mortality provides incentives to invest in education, longer life span increases
the optimal quantity of schooling since it ensures that investments in education will
earn a return over a longer period of time. Their empirical study outcome claims that
after averaging across lower income countries, there is apparently a connection between
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increases in life expectancy at birth and increases in gross secondary school enrolment
that is positively related to higher growth rates. This is also in line with the impact of
life expectancy on economic growth as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). In a parallel
setup, Hu (1995) simulates that the projected population aging in the United States is
likely to increase the growth rate of output by around 0.4 percent, which can be inter-
preted as population aging increases saving, capital accumulation and income growth.
In a slightly modified model, Hu (1999) reaches the same result - demographic changes
leading to population aging can have a positive growth effect on the economy because
they induce an increase in human capital investment.
Taking the Blanchard-Yaari model as the starting point, De la Croix and Licandro
(1999) build an economy in which there is no physical capital (an AH economy), in which
agents decide the length of time spend in school before going to work, and where human
capital accumulation is a function of the optimal length of the schooling period. The
effect of lower mortality rates upon growth turns out to be ambiguous for the following
effect. On the one hand, the depreciation rate of aggregate human capital decreases
as individuals die later on average, agents tend to study more because the expected
flow of future wages has risen, and the human capital per capita increases as positive
effects; on the other hand, the economy consists of more old agents, who spend more
time at school, enter into the labor market at higher ages, therefore a smaller share of
economically active population predicts negative effects. A similar result can be found
in Reinhart (1999), in which a same Blanchard-Yaari model built up through a channel
that only physical capital is assumed: higher life expectancy generates higher growth;
if the mortality rates declines, individual agents discount the future less so that savings
and physical investment increase, and hence the growth rate.
Futagami and Nakajima (2001) suggest that theoretical reasoning used in the liter-
ature to explain how a greater life expectancy gives rise to a higher level of economic
growth through human capital augments must be rephrased. When one considers infinite
71
horizon models following Blanchard-Yaari, there is usually no room for retirement age.
Therefore any increase in life expectancy represents an enlarged working period, thus
increasing the return on human capital investment. But when finite horizon economies
are considered instead, the existence of a retirement age becomes essential to character-
ize the return on human capital investment. Increments in life expectancy by themselves
do not necessarily cause changes in human capital investment. The growth rate might
turn out to be lowered as explained above.
2-2 Aging, saving, and investment
There is a large volume of researches investigating the effects of aging or longer lifespan
of population on saving, investment and economic growth. Bloom et al (2002) present
a careful discussion on an empirical model investigating whether increases in longevity
play an important role in determining aggregate savings. The results are consistent
with those of Lee, Mason and Miller (2000), in which gain in greater life expectancy
is one of the most important determinants of surge in aggregate savings in East Asian
countries; and that of Hurd, McFadden and Can (1998) that agents with higher survival
possibilities save more in the United States. But they argue that these models with age
structure should include life expectancy: conventional models of age structure effects
are misspecified since for given life expectancy, only age distributions that are in dis-
equilibrium affect aggregate savings, therefore, stable population age structure and dis-
equilibrium age distribution (whereas, there exists great gains in life expectancy) effects
have not been distinguished in standard model.
Lee and Tuljapurkar (1997), using the United States data, simulate the consequences
of gains in life expectancy on life time consumption and saving. They show that, when
life expectancy at birth reaches 75 years, which roughly matches American demographic
pattern now, 20 percent of life is spent in dependent childhood, 63 percent spent in the
active producing years and 17 percent in dependent old age. Thus, when the survival
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probability increases, people anticipate longer life span, the present values of expected
consumption and expected life time earnings are altered, and therefore consumption and
labor supply must be adjusted to the loosen life time budget constraint in general equi-
librium. They estimate that a one-year gain in life expectancy can be decomposed, and
about 70 percent are gained in person years lived during old age, which is characterized
by leisure and consumption. This will lead to a boost in the life cycle consumption
needs and social security settlements mechanically, higher premium or pay-roll taxes are
necessary to maintain the same benefits as those under previous lower mortality regime.
Over the long run, one additional year gain in life expectancy demands for a 3.6 percent
increase in pay roll tax relative to the original levels.
2-3 Aging and social security
Meijdam and Verbon (1996) present a two-period overlapping generations general equi-
librium model with rational expectations. As aging is recognized as a combination of a
decrease in the rate of population growth and an improvement in the political power of
the pensioners, the model is designed to analyze its consequences on economic growth
and the evolution of social security schemes. It is consistent with the literature that
extensive public pension schemes adapted in most developed countries now impose a
negative effect on saving and capital-labor ratio (Nerlove and Raut, 1997). Furthermore,
the short-run and long-run effects on the contribution rate may differ as the influenc-
ing political power of old cohorts of population increases while anticipating a decrease
in mortality in Meijdam and Verbon (1996). In the short-run, there is an increase in
tax rates and public pensioners gain in consumption. But in the long-run, the effect is
ambiguous for the contribution rate may decrease since the effect of increased political
power is counteracted by the decreasing wage rate and the rising interest rate resulted
from decreased savings. However, this point of view is contradicted with that of Hansson
and Stuart (1989) which proposes an evolution of increasing contribution rates due to a
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rise in the political power (voting power) of the old in the long-run.
Zhang et al (2001), with similar rational, considere the impacts of increase in longevity
on fertility, human capital investment and growth. Their results are consistent with
Pecchenino and Pollard (1997) to the extent that unfunded PAYG social security plan
impedes human capital investment and growth as an increase in the contribution rate
increases the opportunity cost of time spend on rearing children and thus may increase
fertility and hinder human capital investment and growth. Under analogous framework,
Zhang and Zhang (2001) take into account of a model of increasing longevity’s effects on
growth when there are imperfect loan markets for education, when fertility is treated ex-
ogenously as constant. Their results show that increases in life expectancy have positive
effects on human capital accumulation and growth.
Pecchenino and Pollard (1997) provide a discussion focusing on the aging effects on
economic growth incorporated family and government choices on social security when
facing uncertain lifetimes by introducing actuarially fair annuity markets into overlap-
ping generations endogenous growth model. There are two assumptions about the an-
nuity contributions: one is to allow individuals make voluntary contributions to an
actuarially fair pension plan and the other is that government imposes a mandatory
actuarially fare pension plan. Their analysis suggests that under both assumptions, in-
dividuals’ complete annuitized wealth is not socially optimal though it is individually
optimal, even in the steady state, whereas excess saving brought about by unintended
bequests and incomplete annuitization becomes the strength of economic growth. In-
crease in the social security pay-roll tax rate drives a negative income effect on the
young and a positive income effect on the old via higher social security benefits, as it
reduces the incentive to save and hence capital accumulation as well as the growth rate.
However, this result is in line with many endogenous growth models. On the contrary,
if all wealth is annuitized, then the rate of growth is increasing in the length of life, and
they suggest a switch over from the unfunded PAYG pension system to a fully funded
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actuarially fair annuity markets in their conclusion.
Other studies also show that in the presence of PAYG pension system, the capital-
investment ratio will be below its optimal value. For example, Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1987) predicted a decline in the US national saving rate, and the welfare loss associated
with lower capital formation with the presence of PAYG pension system in the steady-
state is approximated 6 percent. And ImrohogIu and Joines (1995) find that the presence
of a PAYG pension system increases welfare by reducing capital formation.
2.2..3 Changing pattern of pension: from unfunded PAYG to funded pen-
sions
The current formal social security system that is implemented in most industrialized
countries is the PAYG program, which is defined as unfunded pension system; and in
some countries, the pension system takes the form of combinations of the unfunded
PAYG programs and the fully or partially funded system.
• Pay-as-you-go old age security plan requires young people to contribute payroll
taxes (equivalent to their previous saving) to the plan and pays them a pen-
sion(equivalent to their previous dissaving) later on. The system reduces national
saving initially, because the first cohort to benefit from this program, generally
those who were 50 to 65 years old when the plan was introduced, receives a wind-
fall gain. The pension is financed by the reduced saving of the younger generation,
who now pay the payroll tax instead of saving. Because the increased consumption
by the first generation of pensioners is not offset by reduced consumption of the
younger contributing generation, fewer resources are left to be saved and invested
during the initial period, permanently reducing capital stock and national income.
This effect is even worse if the younger generations of workers, i.e., 30 to 50 years
old when the new pension is introduced, receive pensions that exceed their contri-
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butions, as has occurred in many countries. If they anticipate this transfer, they
might try to borrow against their future pensions to consume more when they are
young, further reducing national saving.
Despite the logic of this argument, numerous empirical investigations (most of
them based on U.S data) have been unable to prove conclusively that saving did,
indeed, drop once PAYG programs were established; The reasons for the ambi-
guity are complicated, and will not be explored here. But theoretical researches
mentioned in the previous section show the negative effect of PAYG on saving.
• Full or partial funded scheme requires people to save a specified amount for old
age security. If people were previously saving this amount voluntarily, they would
simply substitute the compulsory pension saving for their voluntary saving, and
net national saving would remain unchanged. But the same forces that reduced
the negative effect of PAYG financing on saving intensify the positive effect of full
funding. For example, it raised the awareness of the importance of saving, and the
lack of credibility of pension schemes lead people to continue to save in addition
to their mandatory pension saving. This saving is committed for the long term,
potentially the most productive kind of saving.
Fully funded pension programs increase saving, if they were absent, the PAYG will
decrease saving. This means that although a mandatory PAYG pension scheme
may have an ambiguous effect on saving, its effect should clearly be negative com-
pared with a mandatary fully funded system.
Many studies have demonstrated the negative effect of PAYG pension system on
saving and investment, and hence lower the income growth; or at least the negative
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effect relative to that of the fully funded pension system. Hence, the commitment of
workers to their PAYG pension schemes appears weakening, and reforms on the PAYG
scheme are undertaking in many industrialized nations as further concerns are brought
about by the aging pressure imposed on the financing of the pension fund. For instance,
many US young workers doubt that they will receive benefits from Social Security when
they retire. There is public discussion of partially privatizing the system or of changing
its taxes and benefits in serious ways. In Australia, the public pension system has
started privatizing since 1995. Chile has switched its mandatory plan from PAYG to
fully funded ones.
Public pension system throughout the world have come under pressure for reform
for three major economic reasons: they yield a rate of return lower than funded system;
as population ages, they are increasingly costly for the working age population, unlike
the fully funded system; and they displace saving and capital.
The strategy adopted in the reform of PAYG is a form of individual saving, whether
privately, or through a variety of financial instruments, or by participating in funded
company sponsored pension programs. There are also fully funded public pension sys-
tems, such as the large mandatory saving programs in Singapore and Malaysia, noted
as institutionalized individual “life cycle saving”.
The major advantage of the strategy is that, in theory, in the long run, after a
transitional period, we would expect that people will save at a higher rate so that capital
stock per person rises. Higher saving will translate into higher capital accumulation,
which will result in higher output in the long term. Since the future young also benefits,
in the form of more capital per worker and hence higher wages, the accumulation-based
strategy offers some equity advantages in an aging society. Beneficial effects might also
accrue from financial deepening, which would stimulate the growth of a financial sector
well suited to allocating capital.
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Problems also accompany with the replacement of unfunded to funded social secu-
rities. First is the increased need to capital to replace the lost transfer wealth. Second
is the need to pay off the implicit debt of the PAYG system (Peterson, 1999; Lee et
al, 2002). The current cohorts that are in the transition period, will have to face the
prospect of paying twice: once to honor commitments under the existing PAYG system
and once to accumulate the capital reserve that will finance the new pension system.
This will reduce the resources available for transition cohorts that lead to reduced sav-
ing, i.e., the implicit debt. In the limit, a transition financed entirely by debt simply
replaces one form of obligation (payroll taxes to support the PAYG pension system)
with another (taxes to pay interest on the public debt). One interpretation of such a
reform is that it just replaces implicit debt with explicit debt.
These complicated effects will interact with the changing demography. In addition
there are potentially labor force responses and general equilibrium effects in closed econ-
omy (Lee, et al, 2002). Debt-financed transition is especially unattractive when the real
interest rate is greater than the rate of population growth, in which case the real per
capita value of government debt rises over time (Disney, 1996). But high real interest
rates combined with low population growth pose a problem not only for debt incurred
during the transition process, but also for debt created to meet unrealistic pension
promises made by the pre-transition pension system.
Empirical evidence on the effects of the transformation of pension systems is mixed.
Most national case studies have found a positive but modest impact of private tax-
sheltered retirement saving schemes on national saving rates. Studies reviewed by the
OECD (Kohl and O’Brian, 1998) suggest that tax incentives raise private savings by 20
to 25 percent of total contributions, with the impact on national savings being less be-
cause of the fiscal offset. In international cross-section estimation, however, a significant
positive relationship holds between pension system assets and the aggregate saving rate
(Bailliu and Reisen 1997). Lee et al (2002) predict that transfer of the pension system
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generates large transfer wealth and corresponding implicit debts in the US Social Se-
curity system. Population aging will drastically increase the implicit debt, making the
transformation of the pension system more costly and difficult.
An older society will inevitably have a lower saving rate than a younger one because
the ratio of consumers to producers is higher. This will be equally true whether the
pension system is PAYG-financed or fully funded; whether it is defined benefit (DB) or
defined contribution (DC, as practiced in Sweden and Italy), and whether it is public
or private. If policymakers could increase savings during the transition to an older
society, however, the economic pie might be enlarged and the difficulties of supporting
a larger elderly population might be diminished. Unfortunately, the evidence that they
can do so is not particularly strong. The transition from PAYG financing to funded
pension scheme (whether a funded public pension system or individual retirement saving
accounts) is likely to increase national savings only if the transition cohorts are willing
to finance both their parents’ retirement and their own. Measures to mandate private
retirement savings can have some effects, but there are substantial offsets elsewhere on
the household balance sheet. Measures to encourage private saving are also subject to
offsetting behavior at the level of the household; in addition, the impact on national
savings is modest once account is taken of on forgone fiscal revenues.
3. Trends of aging and the features of aging in China
3.1. The demographic transition: facts and statistics
In the last five decades since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, China’s
population has experienced a typical process of demographic transition, i.e., from a high
fertility and high mortality reproductive pattern to a low fertility and low mortality pat-
tern. The total fertility rate (TFR) was as high as 5.8 in the early 1950s and has dropped
to well below replacement level in the 1990s, at around 1.9 (NBS, 2000). Meanwhile,
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the crude death rate declined from 20 per thousand to around 6.5 per thousand.
The transition was accompanied by two occasions of “baby-boom”. One was the
birth peak that occurred right after the founding of P.R. China, in the early 1950s;
the other was a compensate birth bulge after period of “Economic Difficulty” in the
early 1960s. Since the early 1970s, with the gradually carrying out of a nation-wide
family planning program, fertility declined drastically. Starting from 1979, China has
put priority on the enforcement of the “one-child” policy for faster decline in fertility
so as to further control the population size. After its implementation for more than 20
years, together with the tremendous socio-economic progress, the reproductive behavior
changed. More and more couples in China tend to have fewer children, the fertility in
China is expected to remain stable at a low level (Xiao, 1992; Valppel and Zeng, 1991;
Zeng, 1996). Recent data from the National Statistical Bureau of China has shown that
the total fertility rate has been maintaining at a low level at 1.9 in the 1990s. Meanwhile,
mortality, among the elderly has been continuously decreasing with the development of
science and technology and the rise of living standard of the people. The life expectancy
at birth went up from around 34 years in 1949 (NBS, 1996) to an average of 70 years
in 2000, and will increase to an average of about 78 in year 2050 according to the latest
projection of the World Bank (World Bank, 2002). As the result of the demographic
transition, especially the drastic changes in fertility, and the persistent reduction in
mortality, China’s population age structure experienced significant changes.
3.2. The changing age structure
The fast changing reproductive pattern of China’s population has created irregular waves
for different age cohorts and therefore generated drastic changes in the age distribution
of the Chinese population.
The population pyramid of China indicates clearly the changing proportion of China’s
population age structure (Figure 3.1 and 3.2). The 1964 pyramid has a typical “bell”
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shape, which shows a very board base and narrow shoulder that represents relatively
younger age profiles. The 2000 pyramid characterizes the changing aging structure: the
base is shrinking, the waist is a bit wider than the base, and the shoulder is gradually
becoming wider. This indicated that the population is getting matured. And eventually,
the 2050 pyramid is projected to have a shape of a rectangle, each age group’s proportion
to total population is evenly distributed; which means the population is becoming stable
and is getting older.
If we compare the changes in the dependency ratios of the population, the trend of
aging in China is even more obvious. From the 1950s to the early 1970s, as the con-
sequence of high fertility and lowered mortality, there was a fast population expansion.
The effect on age distribution is reflected by the high persistent youth dependency ra-
tio1, which was extremely high, of more than 70 percent in year 1965 (NBS, 1996-2000).
From late 1970s to the end of 20th century, as China has carried out its family planning
program (the one-child policy), the fertility level has declined fast, total fertility rate fell
to the level that is below the replacement level, fewer children have been born leading
to a relatively smaller youth cohort compared to older age cohorts. As the previous
dependent cohort started to enter their working age, one has witnessed a continuous
and steady decline in the dependency ratio, which dropped to less than 50 percent by
2000 (NBS, 2000).
According to the population projections of the United Nations (UN, 1998), the pace
of aging in China will be faster in the first decades of the 21st century, and accelerate
after 2015. Figure 3.3 presents the projected youth and old age dependency ratio of
China’s population by the United Nations, which shows that the youth dependency
ratio continues to decline and will maintain roughly stable at below 30 percent; on the
other hand, the old age dependency ratio is climbing up fast after 2015, and roughly
1Youth dependency ratio: the ratio of persons in the youth dependent ages (under 15 years) to those
in the economically productive ages(15-64) in the population.
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after year 2030, the old age dependency ratio will exceed the youth dependency ratio
and keep on increasing till year 2050 to nearly 40 percent. The overall dependency ratio
declines to the lowest in year 2010, then rises again and will reach above 60 percent in
the year 2050.
3.3. The pace of China’s aging
With the decreases or stable trends in fertility and mortality, combined with the mo-
mentum of the demographic transition, China’s aging process is unique compared to
other populations in the following aspects:
Firstly, the pace of aging in China is rapid, and will accelerate after 2020. The
growth rate of elderly (aged 65 and above) will be roughly 3 percent in the next 50
years, higher than the total population growth rate per annum, which is around 1.6
percent (Xiong, 2000). According to United Nations’ population projection (UN, 1998),
by the year 2027, the elderly will make up 14 percent of the total population, and this
proportion will increase to 23 percent in year 2050. It took most of the industrialized
countries 80 to 100 years to double the proportion of their old people, but it will only
take China about 27 years to double from 7 percent to 14 percent (Table 3.1). Japan is
regarded as a country with very rapid population aging, but the aging process in China
is even faster than that for Japan (Ogawa, 1988). This is due mainly to the momentum
of the two baby-boom cohorts, who are turning old now while having fewer children in
the meantime.
Secondly, the size of absolute number of the aged population is large because of the
large population base. At present, though the percentage of elderly is not very high,
at 7 percent, it translates into absolute number of 86 million people. The number will
increase to 232 million by year 2030. By 2050, China’s elderly people will make up about
one-quarter of the world’s elderly people, and the number of people aged 65 and over in
China (around 330 million) will be very close to the projected total population of the
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United States (POPIN, 2000). China’s elderly population will outnumber of India’s by
103 million, while the Chinese total population size will be smaller than that of India
by 51 million in year 2050.
Thirdly, not only the total number of elderly is huge, but the number of the eldest
elderly is also considerably large. The age composition of projections shows that before
year 2025, the age groups of 65-69 grow faster than other elderly age groups; after 2025,
however, age 70 and above groups will grow even faster (UN, 1998; World Bank, 2002).
And by the year 2050, the number of people aged 80 and above will be more than 80
million. Moreover, China will have 470,000 centenaries at that time (Wu, 2002). The
amounts of services, benefits and transfers that are consumed by the eldest old people
will be far out of proportion compared to their numbers. They are the most that needed
help.
And lastly, China has a GDP per capita that is lower than that in many developing
countries, but the average age of its population and the proportion of the elderly will
reach more or less the same levels as those in the industrialized countries. In other words,
China will have a high-income economy’s old-age burden but a low- or middle-income
economy’s carrying capacities that support the burdens.
4. The Economic Consequences of Population Aging
and Pension System in China
4.1. The Economics Consequences
The rapid population aging and the unique features of China’s aging process and the
future population trends raise important concerns about the socio-economic development
and the well-beings of the elderly. Aging affects dependency ratio, consumption and
production, savings and investment; it also influences public expenditures and fiscal
policy as well. For welfare concerns, aging of an economy will require specific policy
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measures, covering employment, pension system, and health care.
On the one hand, as people grow older biologically, their physical strength and mental
capabilities diminish, thus, as the average age of working population grows, their average
productivity reduces. As China is currently a low income country that is trying to
increase its per capita income; a higher proportion of population that is economically
active and productive is very important to the economic growth. As the population is
aging and it has to face the challenge of less productive population in the near future
before getting rich. On the other hand, the accelerated pace of aging in the next five
decades, the large number of the elderly population, especially the increasing number
of the eldest elderly will require enormous funding to meet the needs of old age pension
and health care. How a poor country like China will manage to take care of the old
people in an aging society, which is the typical rich country’s concern, attracts much
attentions.
However, the economic effects of aging induced by declining fertility are different
with those of aging caused by increasing longevity (decline in mortality). One difference
is that decreasing fertility reduces the number of children who need to be supported,
while increasing longevity does not. A reduction in the burden of children may offset
the increased burden of the elderly. But there is a more important economic difference
between population aging caused by declining fertility and that by increasing longevity;
shrinking fertility leads to slower growth of the labor force, but rising longevity does
not. In China, the mortality rate has been declining for five decades at a slow but
persistent pace, increasing life expectancy at birth indicates that China gained largely
on longevity. But the most important factor that determines accelerating aging is the
drastic changes in fertility, the TFR dropped from over 6 in 1949 to merely 1.9 by the
turn of the century. The declining fertility will therefore illustrate important economic
effects-a shrinking labor force; currently, there are about 7.75 workers to support one
retiree, and this ratio will reduce to three workers over one retiree after 2040 (Wu et al,
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2000).
4.2. The Current Social Security System
4.2..1 Overview
Compared to other countries that facing the aging burden, China’s aging issue is far
more serious. Countries such as OECD countries are mostly developed economies with
high per capita incomes, and the coverage of pension schemes for old people are very high
under different schemes either as the PAYG or fully funded social security programmes,
say, annuity insurance (World Bank, 1994). Contrarily, China is still a low-income
country whose social security system is underdeveloped.
Traditionally, in China and most Asian countries, family clans played an important
role in taking care of each family member with no government and market investment.
The extended family takes care of insurance, redistribution, and even investment and
saving for children, or housing for the whole family. It works as informal systems of old
age security since supporting the old is the deeply embedded sense of filial loyalty in
China (World Bank, 1997).
Since the founding of the P.R. China, people in urban areas enjoy subsidies in health
care, education, housing as well as retirement pension if they are formal employees of
the state; while for non-state employees, families and people in the rural areas, infor-
mal arrangement is the only source of old age security. Although modernization lowers
the prestige of the old, reduces their control over resources, and diminishes the effec-
tiveness of the extended family in pooling income and risk, informal arrangement is
still an important scheme for the rural old. After China’s economic reform in 1978, the
economic-social infrastructures have been paced out of the traditional pattern gradually.
The pension system was also under substantial changes. Full subsidies from government
are no longer available; instead, an employment-based PAYG scheme has been intro-
duced as the retirement support. In the 1990s, China has started to implement fully
85
funded pension schemes, but the previous PAYG system was still the basic pension
plan. And the government has given permissions for insurance companies to involve in
operating public security schemes in the 1990s.
The pension system is currently in a transition from an enterprise-base scheme to a
scheme of social pools. Therefore, generally speaking, at present stage, the social security
system of China is the combination of unfunded PAYG, partially funded, market origin
insurances and large informal sector practices (Song and Chu, 1997; Xiong, 2000).
There exists both PAYG type scheme as well as funded scheme, but the range of
coverage is particularly limited to the formal employees of government, State Owned
Enterprises (SOEs) or Collective Owned Enterprises (COEs). For most of the rural
people, which account for more than 60 percent of the total population, self-insurance
schemes or other informal arrangements are the only options for old age support. In
recent years, there have been pilot pension schemes (funded schemes with individual
accounts) implemented in a number of rural areas on a limited basis (World Bank, 1997;
Xiong, 2000), which have not been expanded to all the rural population so far.
4.2..2 Features of China’s current pension system
As mentioned above, the current pension system in China is considerably a combination
of unfunded PAYG, partially funded and self-insurance schemes. We first present the
features of China’s pension system that has been implemented in most of the “formal”
sectors. And then state the changes in pension programs proposed by The Chinese State
Council in 1997.
2.1 Retirement benefits of employees in the state sector:
The followings are the salient features of China’s pension schemes covering formal
employees in SOEs and COEs:
a. Pay-as-you-go basis;
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b. Enterprises are responsible for funding and managing pension of their workers.
For enterprises in financial difficulty, the State would generally provide a
subsidy; however, since the early 1990’s, the subsidies have been curtailed
under the economic reforms;
c. Benifits are set about 80 percent of the wage in the final year before retire-
ment;
d. Benefits commence at age 60 for men and 55 for women (benefits can be paid
earlier if engaged in hazardous jobs);
e. Full benefit payment with 10 years of service;
f. Benefits are indexed to wage increases, not to inflation;
g. Most plans are non-contributory, i.e., contributions are made by enterprises
only; for some plans which are contributory, employees pay 3 percent with
the reminder paid by the employers;
h. The contribution level is set at a rate such that the contribution amount
would be slightly larger than the benefit payment;
i. In 1998, the average contribution rate was about 14 percent of the salary.
However, the amount of contribution varies considerably among industries
and among regions. For companies with many young workers and few retirees,
the contribution rate could be very low, but for the companies with few young
workers and a large number of retirees, the contribution rate could be as high
as 25 percent.
So, within the formal sectors, the pension for old age support was a PAYG pattern with
the employers that were fully responsible for the financing of pension benefits. Though,
reforms have been undertaking, such as to request the employees to contribute at a
small rate in the 1990s, it was virtually a unfunded pension scheme that firms took the
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obligations of pension payment for their retired employees.
However, as the economic reform deepened in 1990s, this pension system encountered
increasing challenges as the economy has been transferring towards a market-oriented
one. For instance, the ownerships of firms and workers have been varying over time,
former state sector employees became self-employed or employees of joint-venture enter-
prises. Disputes arisen because the shifts may cost the entitlement of pension benefits
that have been accumulated with former services of employment in the state sectors.
And the concerns of losing their earned benefits have limited the mobility of workers,
that was lagged behind the pace of economic reform in China. Therefore, lack of pen-
sion portability became a major barrier to the further reforms especially in the state
sectors. There are other problems, such as firms were unable to make contributions
for their participated pensioners due to firms’ mal-functioning under the new market
environment. Hence, seeking for resolutions for the retirement and old age support was
an urgent concern for the government.
There were several major steps in the reform of pension system in China. In 1991, it
was proposed the integration of local pension programmes, provincial level programmes
and further, national level programmes, along with unifying pension provisions. At this
time, employees were also required to share the responsibility for contributing to their
own retirement with their employers and the State, and the State Council decided that
the old age pensions were to be introduced in the rural areas. A guideline of a three-tier
pension system was provided in this year, which was an individually-focused funded
pension contributed by employees and their employers.
In 1995, the State Council announced the establishment of individual pension ac-
counts, it also proposed to expand the pension coverage to all urban workers regardless
of firm ownerships. In 1996 and 1997, further reforms were observed in the state owned
sectors, the restructuring of SOEs have seen the massive laid-off of workers. Those
laid-off workers were seriously concerned that they would lose their earned pension en-
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titlements with original employers if the ties with the state sectors were cut. Again,
setting up an unified, portable social pension system became urgent.
2.2 The establishment of a new system:
To address the pension problems, the Chinese State Council in 1997 released a landmark
pension document entitled “Decisions on the Establishment of the Unified Basic Pension
System for Enterprise Workers”. The document introduced a three-tier social pension
system, including
• A first tier flat pension (“social pool”),
• A second tier employer/employee pension (“individual accounts”), and
• A third tier individual supplementary pension.
The basic pension consists of the first tier flat social pool pension and the second
tier employer/employee individual account pension. Tier one and tier two pensions are
mandatory while tier three pension is voluntary with contributions made by individuals
only. The main features of the proposed basic pension plan are as follows2:
a. The basic pension plan will be pre-funded;
b. Coverage will be extended to rural areas and other enterprises;
c. Individual Accounts are fully portable;
d. The pensionable earnings for the basic pension are subject to a minimum of 60
percent and maximum of 300 percent of the provincial average salary;
2The proposed pension contained a number of features which were included in the recommenda-
tion by the World Bank Pension Reform Study (1996), including expansion of coverage, lowering the
replacement ratio, establishment of multi-tier pension and pre-funding of the pension benefit.
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e. First tier pension will provide a basic flat benefit equal to 20 percent of local
average salary; second tier pension will be equal to the cumulative total of the
individual account divided by 120. It is expected that retirees will receive a 60
percent replacement rate (tier one and two combined) when the new system is
fully mature3;
f. Benefits will commence at age 65;
g. Benefits will be indexed to CPI;
h. Tier one and tier two benefits will be payable to retirees with a minimum 15
pensionable years of service. If an employee has less than 15 years of service, only
benefits from his/her individual account will be payable as a lump sum;
i. There will be special benefit rules (yet to-be-announced) for those retirees who
have already received pension under the old pension rules and for those workers
who have accumulated pensionable years of service under the old pension rules;
j. Plans will be contributory by both employers and employees. Contributions made
by employers will go to both the social pool and individual accounts. Contributions
made by employees will go to individual accounts only;
k. The government will set the contribution rates into the social pool and individual
accounts. For employers, the annual contribution will be 20 percent of the salary,
with 13 percent going to social pool (ultimately increased to 17 percent) and 7 per-
cent to the individual accounts (ultimately reduced to 3 percent). For employees,
the annual contribution will be 4 percent of the salary, increased by 1 percent every
two years until it reaches 8 percent. Thus, the combined annual contributions by
employer and employee to the individual accounts will be 11 percent;
3The replacement rate will depend on the future wage increase, investment income earned on Indi-
vidual Accounts, length of employment and retirement age. The 60% replacement rate assumes that
the employee has 35 years of services, wage increase of 3% and investment return of 5% per year.
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l. Funds in the social pool will also pay for pensions to those already retired or
unfunded liabilities of workers who have started working before the new pension
system.
The new system has a mixed pattern: the first tier mandatory defined benefit (DB)
pension for redistribution; the second tier mandatory defined contribution (DC) pension
for each worker; and the third tier a voluntary individual pension. And it is designed at
this stage, the new system only covers the retirement benefits of “enterprise workers”.
The first tier PAYG DB plan with flat rate basic benefits guarantees a replacement rate
of 20 percent of the average wages at retirement to those retirees with the minimum 15-
year coverage. And the second tier funded DC plan with individual accounts, monthly
pension benefits will be the account balance at retirement divided by 120. The combined
replacement rate of tier one and tier two benefits is estimated at approximately 60
percent for workers with 35 years of services.
In 1999, the State Council was requested to speed up the expanding coverage to
employees of non-state enterprises and migrant workers. And in 2001 and 2002, Liaoning
province started to undertake experiments to create real individual accounts in the
second tier pension and encourage expanding the third tier supplementary pensions.
The government hopes that the experiences accumulated from the pilot programmes
practiced in Liaoning province can be expanded to other provinces, with an growing
coverage toward rural population.
4.2..3 Some major issues of pensions
Based on the features of the old formal pension schemes and the proposed pension
reform, Wu et al (2000) forecasted the complex old age funding problems caused by the
aging population in China. Under the current demographic pattern, i.e., the fertility and
mortality level, and the one-child policy unchanged, they predicted that if the pension
system was to maintain the PAYG system, the contribution rate must be increased
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substantially from 14 percent in 1998, to 18 percent in 2014, 28 percent in 2023, 40
percent in 2033, and ultimately 50 percent in 2051. However, this projection assumes a
pension coverage rate of 48 percent only for urban workers. As a result, it has been a
high priority of the State government to reform the pension system before the population
aging compounds the problem.
Under the Proposed Pension System established in 1997, China is making efforts to
transfer the old PAYG pension system to a new “pre-funding” one, which is a combi-
nation of unfunded PAYG, fully-funded and partially funded system in its nature. This
move of pension reform is in line with international practices in the reforms of social
security system. But compare to other countries, China faces even tough challenges
in the reform of the pension system to meet the needs of older population. There are
several crucial problems that attract government’s special concerns.
3-1 The financing of the pension.
First, as pointed by Perterson (1999) and Lee et al (2002). The switch over from
PAYG to funded pension, is accompanied with a transfer of debt, from implicit
debt to explicit debt. The pension financing in China is in difficulty, as the so-
cial security pensions are suffering from a current account deficit. If the current
provisions of the new system remained unchanged, the long run funding situations
would be worsen. The estimated contribution rates will be as high as 40 percent
in 2033, more than doubled the current rates (Wu et al, 2000).
Second, we have discussed the problems associated with the reforms of transferring
from unfunded PYAG to funded social security pension systems in the industri-
alized countries in Section two of this essay. During the transition of its pension
systems, China will face similar challenges. The switch over creates debts to gov-
ernment, which puts more pressure on central government who has been running
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persistent deficits since 1979. The central government may consider to make up
the pension deficits simply by increasing contributions or by raising taxes. This
works as wealth transfers from the current working population to current pension-
ers, which is difficult to be implemented in China since for both types of pension,
less compliance exists. Encouraging the current working population to participate
and be compliant to the shift of pension plans is not an easy task.
Third, the second tier individual accounts were established as fully funded, but in
reality, these accounts are virtually empty, as the funds have been redirected to
the first tier social pooling account. This problem arises from the current funding
shortfalls and from mismanagement of transition costs associated with the switch
from PAYG to funded schemes. Another problem for the individual accounts is
that the rate of return of investment is set administratively at relatively low rate by
the government. This will lead to lower compliance to the second tier contributions.
3-2 The low coverage rate of the pension.
Since the previous PAYG pension covered only state sector employees and also be-
cause the current pension system was newly established, the coverage rate of the
system is very low. Currently, around 80 percent of the SOE’s/COE’s workers, 30
percent of other employees, and 20 percent of rural population are covered by the
pension scheme. Government hopes that in 2010, all of the SOE/COE workers
and 80 percent of other employees will be covered by the scheme, and the coverage
rate of rural population will be 50 percent by then.
However, for the rural pension participants, there is no financial support from
the government. The core is a voluntary individual DC plan into the second tier
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individual accounts, depends fully on private saving. Both the contribution level
and the benefit level are very low due to the low income of rural peasants. For
example, some of rural pension participants, aged from 12 to 50 years, may choose
to contribute 4 to 20 RenMiBi Yuan per month. They will receive a benefit of 50
Yuan when they reach the age of 60. Hence, beyond the low coverage rate, the
very low level of pension benefits is another major concern. As more than half
of the total population live in the rural areas, and most of them are still poor,
expanding the new pension system to rural population will not be an easy task for
the Chinese government.
3-3 Governance/institutional reform/implementation
The proposed new pension system has basically two types of funding. One is the
first tier social pooling (DB) and the other is the fully funded pension scheme (DC)
for employees for the SOEs/COEs and other enterprises.
With the new system, the social pooling has shifted the responsibility of each en-
terprise to a broader field, within the municipal pooling; and ultimately to the
provincial level. However, currently in China, many municipalities had not been
experienced in administering the social pooling funds; or they had not acquired
advanced skills nor capacity to manage those funds. In the transition to shift to the
funding pool, the separation of administrative control from financial obligations
may induce moral hazard and compliance problems. Enterprises may under-report
wages and the number of workers; employees may act less compliantly in partic-
ipating the DC plan. This is due to the lack of legislations and governance on
the responsibilities of both employers and pensioners, which calls for institutional
reforms urgently in many areas. The government is weak in enforcement capacity
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over enterprises; and needs to give incentives for enterprises and their employees
to participate honestly in the system.
There exists large scale of under-report of wages, several components of grey in-
come and bonuses are excluded from the reported wages. Incentives should be
given for full reporting of wages, such as allowing full deduction of wages in cor-
porate income tax and permitting full deduction of contributions in personal tax.
Lack of transparency in personal income reporting and governance; and lack of
effectiveness of banking system are part of the reasons for the massive under-
reporting of wages. This again, is linked to issues of the institutional reforms in
China.
Financial market reform is another major concern. Even though the coverage for
fully funded pension is not very high, the number of pensioners under such schemes
will be considerably large, given the size of China’s elderly population. There will
be a substantial amount of pension assets accumulated from the tier one and tier
two contributions to the social pooling and individual accounts in the long run.
To maximaize the investment returns of pension assets, the financial market in
China needs to be further developed with more investment options available to
pension funds. Currently, the investment of funds is mostly restricted to investing
in government bonds and bank deposits.
Another important component of the proposed new pension programs is the pri-
vate saving from the tier three contributions to the individual accounts for the
formal employees. Under the proposed system, the basic pension would provide
an average benefit equal to 60 percent replacement ratio (20 percent tier one social
95
pooling and 40 percent tier two individual accounts). Therefore, individuals need
to purchase additional voluntary pension from commercial life insurance compa-
nies4 to supplement the basic pension if they wish to secure a more than 60 percent
replacement ratio. There will be increasing needs for individuals choosing to par-
ticipate in funded financial assets that provide expected higher returns. This will
require further opening up for the financial markets.
Finally, the proposed new pension scheme has planned to be expanding to the
other enterprises employees (including migrant workers), and rural population.
And there is no specified plans released so far for these groups of population,
government hopes to take the advantages of the experience obtained in Liaoning
province in expanding the pension schemes. However, with the fast changing de-
mography and rapid aging in China, this task becomes urgent for welfare concerns
of the old age population, especially the rural old. The government may think to
seek alternative ways in the pension reform towards rural population, in coordina-
tion with the Liaoning experiences.
In sum, the prospects of funded pension plans depend crucially on how well the
domestic financial market is developed, a reliable banking system is implemented;
and whether well-organized regulating and monitoring institutions against invest-
ment risks are established, and how administrative costs are minimized. Trans-
parency is a basis for active participation and effective communication. These are
4The China insurance market has been dominated by three domestic life insurance companies, the
China Life, China Pacific Life and Ping An. With a controlled opening up of insurance market in
mid-1990s, new licenses have been issued to both domestic and joint venture insurers. At the end of
1999, there was a total of five domestic life insurance companies (namely the China Life, China Pacific
Life, Ping An, Tai Kang Life and New China Life) and five joint venture life insurance companies whose
foreign partners are AIA, Manulife, Allianz, Aneta and AXA. It is expected that additional licenses will
be granted to domestic and joint venture life insurance companies in the future.
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true challenges for China, as it is in transition from a central-planned economy to a
market-oriented economy with low average income level, to meet the requirements.
The Chinese government needs to be prepared to the handling of the social security
problem in a long run perspective, taking the experiences of industrialized countries
into consideration while fitting with China’s own features of demography and pension
system. However, for the existing pension schemes, PAYG or funded pensions, both are
simply ways of dividing output between workers and pensioners, should not fare very
differently in the face of demographic changes. The real security behind any pension
plan is a wealthy and healthy economy. The crucial variable is output. Hence, the most
challenging thing is trying to promote income growth so as to maintain the welfare needs
of each generation of the entire population.
5. Conclusion
With the changing demography, the population is aging fast in the industrialized coun-
tries and also in some of the developing countries. In order to finance the social security,
many industrialized countries have implemented the PAYG pension system. However,
as the aging process accelerates due to continuous decline in fertility, and improvements
in health status, the PAYG pension is under the pressure of reform as it lowers saving
and investment, and hence income growth.
Many countries are making reform or considering to shift the unfunded PAYG pension
to fully funded or partially funded pension systems. But the switch over from the PAYG
to funded social security creates problems in the funding of pension schemes and takes
generations to complete the transfer, which will result in both political concerns and
economic implications on government policies.
China is a special case, that on the one hand, it is facing a big challenge in trying to
improve its economic progress as it is still a low income country; on the other hand, due
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to drastic demographic transition, it is facing a rapid aging problem which is usually
a problem for those wealthy countries. The social security system in China is well
underdeveloped for its low coverage rate, and the funding of the pension. Although the
Chinese government is trying to meet the pension needs of the elderly by reforming the
pension system, the government has to face different challenges. Reforms in institutional
instruments, legal legislations and financial markets are urgent concerns for China.
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Table 3.1 Comparison of pace of aging in selected countries
Specific years attaining Years required to
Country the percentage of the aged double the aged
(as a share of total population) share of population
from 7% to 14%
7% 14%
Japan 1970 1994 24
France 1865 1980 115
Netherlands 1940 2003 65
Norway 1885 1978 93
Sweden 1890 1975 85
Switzerland 1935 1985 50
U.S.A 1945 2014 69
P.R. China 2000 2027 27
Sources: A. Before 1940:
United Nations, “The Aging of Population and its Economic and
Social Implications”, Population Studies, No. 26, New York, 1956.
B. After 1940:
1. United Nations, “World Population Perspects 1990”, Population
Studies, No. 120, New York, 1991.
2. United Nations, World Population Perspects, the 2000 Revision,
Vol. 2, New York, 2001.
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Figure 3.1 Population Pyramids, China 
     (1964, 2000) 
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